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This paper shows that real decisions depend not only on the total amount of information in 
prices, but the source of this information—a manager learns from prices when they contain 
information not possessed by him. We use the staggered enforcement of insider trading 
laws across 27 countries as a shock to the source of information that leaves total infor- 
mation unchanged: enforcement reduces (increases) managers’ (outsiders’) contribution to 
the stock price. Consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, enforcement in- 
creases investment- q sensitivity, even when controlling for total price informativeness. The 
effect is larger in industries where learning is likely to be stronger, and in emerging coun- 
tries where outsider information acquisition rises most post-enforcement. Enforcement 
does not increase the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow, a non-price measure of invest- 
ment opportunities. These ﬁndings suggest that extant measures of price eﬃciency should 
be rethought when evaluating real eﬃciency. More broadly, our paper provides causal ev- 
idence that managers learn from prices, by using a shock to price informativeness. 
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Eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets can promote eﬃcient real 
decisions. When prices are more informative, outside in- 
vestors suffer less information asymmetry. As a result, they 
are more willing to provide capital to ﬁrms in primary ﬁ- 
nancial markets, facilitating investment ( Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981 ). Under this channel, the extent to which ﬁnancial 
markets support capital raising, and thus real investment, 
depends on the total amount of information in prices. 
In a recent survey, Bond et al. (2012) term this notion 
Forecasting Price Eﬃciency (FPE), i.e., the extent to which 
prices predict fundamental values. Due to this conven- 
tional view, regulatory changes (e.g., short-sale constraints 
and transaction taxes) are typically evaluated according to 
their likely impact on total price informativeness. article under the CC BY license. 
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1 Fishman and Hagerty (1992) also show that ITE encourages out- 
siders to gather more information, but do not study its effect on RPE or 
investment- q sensitivity. 
2 Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) ﬁnd that the effect of ITE on total price 
informativeness in emerging countries is insigniﬁcantly negative , control- 
ling for other country-level variables. However, Bond et al. (2012) note that most activity oc-
curs in secondary ﬁnancial markets, where no new capital
is raised by ﬁrms. Secondary markets improve real deci-
sions through a different channel: they aggregate the in-
formation of millions of investors ( Hayek, 1945 ), which can
guide managerial actions. The value of secondary markets
for real decisions may not depend on the total informa-
tion in prices (FPE), because some of this information is
already known to the decision maker. Since he will use his
own information regardless of the degree to which it is in
the price, this degree does not matter for real eﬃciency.
Instead, the value of secondary markets depends on the
amount of information prices reveal for decision-making—
i.e., the amount of information not already possessed by the
decision maker . Bond et al. term this notion Revelatory Price
Eﬃciency (RPE) and propose it as a new measure of ﬁ-
nancial eﬃciency. However, RPE has no natural empirical
proxy, making it diﬃcult to study empirically. 
Our goal is to study whether real decisions depend on
RPE, and thus the source of information in prices, rather
than only total information (FPE). This question is impor-
tant, because if RPE indeed matters, standard measures of
ﬁnancial eﬃciency are not suﬃcient for gauging real ef-
ﬁciency. We study this question in the context of invest-
ment, a major corporate decision. Speciﬁcally, we hypoth-
esize that the manager uses the stock price as a signal of
his investment opportunities, and so the sensitivity of in-
vestment to Tobin’s q will be increasing in the amount of
information in prices not possessed by him. 
We address the absence of a natural measure for RPE by
studying a plausible shock to RPE that need not affect FPE.
Such a shock should satisfy three criteria. First, it should
increase the amount of outsider information in the stock
price, by raising outsiders’ incentives to acquire informa-
tion. Second, it should not increase total information, i.e.,
FPE, and thus should also decrease the amount of insider
information in the stock price. Satisfying both criteria si-
multaneously is diﬃcult, since commonly used shocks to
the ability to trade on information, and thus the incen-
tives to acquire it in the ﬁrst place (e.g., decimalization)
affect both insiders and outsiders. Third, it should not af-
fect investment- q sensitivity directly. 
We build a theoretical model which demonstrates
how insider trading enforcement (ITE) satisﬁes the above
criteria. Our model features an insider, multiple outsiders,
and liquidity traders. While most models of learning
from prices cap trading volumes (e.g. between −1 and
+1) and assume that traders are exogenously informed
or uninformed, our model features endogenous trading
volumes and endogenous information acquisition, which
are both critical for understanding the effect of ITE on
price eﬃciency and real eﬃciency. Despite this richness,
we are able to solve for all key quantities in closed form,
leading to clear empirical predictions. In our model, the
insider (the ﬁrm’s manager) has private information, and
outsiders can acquire it at a cost; both trade on their in-
formation. The manager also takes an investment decision
whose value depends on private information. The insider
and informed outsiders have different components of
private information—the manager is better informed about
internal ﬁrm conditions and outsiders about industryprospects—and so the manager wishes to learn outsiders’
information from prices. The extent to which he does so
depends on the relevance of outsiders’ information for
investment. 
By deterring insiders from trading, ITE reduces com-
petition, thus leading to outsiders gathering more infor-
mation and increasing the information in prices not pos-
sessed by the manager (RPE). However, ITE has an am-
biguous effect on total information (FPE), depending on
whether the rise in outsider information in prices is larger
or smaller than the fall in insider information. Regardless
of the sign of the effect on FPE, investment- q sensitivity
rises due to the increase in RPE, if outsiders’ information
is suﬃciently relevant for investment. 1 The model’s results
apply to both cross-sectional and time-series investment- q
sensitivity. The greater the new information in stock prices,
the greater the extent to which managers of different ﬁrms
will base their investment levels on their respective stock
prices (increasing cross-sectional investment- q sensitivity)
and to which a given manager will vary his investment
level around the ﬁrm mean depending on how his stock
price varies around the ﬁrm mean (increasing time-series
investment- q sensitivity). 
The strength of the effect of ITE on RPE (and thus
investment- q sensitivity) and FPE depends on various pa-
rameters. Empirically, Bushman et al. (2005) ﬁnd that an-
alyst coverage (a measure of outsider information acquisi-
tion) rises after ITE, particularly in emerging countries, and
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) ﬁnd that total price infor-
mativeness is unchanged following ITE in emerging coun-
tries 2 (while it rises in developed countries). Thus, the
model predicts that the increase in investment- q sensitiv-
ity will be stronger in emerging countries, even though FPE
does not rise in such countries. In addition to the theoreti-
cal justiﬁcations, a separate advantage of ITE is that it was
staggered over time across 27 countries, reducing the risk
that any single event was correlated with other factors that
drive investment- q sensitivity. 
We test the model’s predictions using a difference-in-
differences analysis, conducted using three speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst is a single-stage analysis, where we regress in-
vestment on q and its interactions with ITE. We control not
only for country and year ﬁxed effects to capture between-
country and across-year differences in investment (as in a
standard difference-in-differences analysis), but also these
ﬁxed effects interacted with q to capture between-country
and across-year differences in investment- q sensitivity.
Our speciﬁcation thus extends the generalized difference-
in-differences framework to a setting where the outcome
of interest is a slope coeﬃcient (investment- q sensitivity),
rather than a level variable. We ﬁnd that ITE increases
investment- q sensitivity by 38%, signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
One potential concern is that ITE affects investment- q
sensitivity because it leads to an increase in FPE, rather
76 A. Edmans et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 126 (2017) 74–96 than RPE. We address this issue in two ways. First, we 
show that the results remain robust to controlling for two 
measures of FPE (ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation and the 
fraction of non zero return days in the year) and their in- 
teractions with q . Second, we ﬁnd that the effect of ITE 
is stronger in emerging countries, where prior research 
has found that FPE is unchanged and RPE increases more 
strongly. 
The second speciﬁcation is a two-stage analysis that 
focuses on changes in cross-sectional investment- q sensi- 
tivity. We ﬁrst estimate investment- q sensitivity for each 
country-year and then regress these estimated sensitiv- 
ities on ITE indicators, country controls, and country 
and year ﬁxed effects. The third speciﬁcation is a two- 
stage analysis that captures both time-series and cross- 
sectional investment- q sensitivity. The ﬁrst stage esti- 
mates investment- q sensitivity over one panel for the pre- 
enforcement period and a second panel for the post- 
enforcement period. The second stage regresses these 
country-period investment- q sensitivities on ITE indicators. 
Both two-stage analyses show that investment- q sensitivity 
rises signiﬁcantly post-ITE for emerging countries. 
In addition to potential changes in FPE, a second con- 
cern is that ITE is not random. Countries choose whether 
to enforce insider trading laws, and this decision could be 
correlated with omitted macroeconomic variables that also 
drive investment- q sensitivity. For example, ITE could be 
correlated with improvements to the ﬁnancial sector that 
weaken ﬁnancing constraints, or with laws that improve 
governance and lead to the manager investing more eﬃ- 
ciently. Both channels could lead to the ﬁrm responding 
more readily to investment signals (such as q ). 3 
We address the endogeneity of ITE with several ﬁndings 
which, taken together, narrow the range of admissible al- 
ternative explanations. First, as described above, the effect 
of ITE is stronger in emerging countries, where outsider in- 
formation acquisition rises most ( Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith, 2005 ). Second, the sensitivity of investment to cash 
ﬂow, a non-price measure of investment opportunities, is 
unchanged following ITE. This ﬁnding is consistent with 
the manager learning more from prices when they contain 
more information not known to him, but not with him re- 
sponding more readily to investment opportunities in gen- 
eral after ITE. 
Third, our model predicts that the effect of ITE on 
investment- q sensitivity is increasing in the relevance of 
outsiders’ information for the investment decision. Allen 
(1993) predicts that the manager will rely less on price 
signals in industries with high competition (since he can 
already estimate his ﬁrm’s production function by observ- 
ing the actions of his numerous rivals) and low production 
function uncertainty (since there is less to learn). Consis- 3 A third alternative explanation is that insider trading is a way of com- 
pensating the manager, and so the ﬁrm must increase compensation post- 
ITE to keep the manager at his reservation utility ( Baiman and Verrec- 
chia, 1996 ). However, this increased compensation could be paid in ﬁxed 
salary, and thus not affect investment- q sensitivity. If it were paid in eq- 
uity, it might increase managerial eﬃciency in a similar way to superior 
governance, and so we address this hypothesis using the same tests as for 
governance. For example, we show that investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity 
does not increase, and insider trading announcement has no effect. tent with both predictions, the effect of ITE in emerging 
countries is only signiﬁcant in concentrated industries, de- 
ﬁned either using the price-cost margin or Herﬁndahl in- 
dex of sales, or industries with high sales volatility. Sepa- 
rately, the effect of ITE in emerging countries is only sig- 
niﬁcant for ﬁrms with low analyst coverage. In such ﬁrms, 
there is most potential for analyst coverage (i.e., outside in- 
formation acquisition) to rise post-ITE; furthermore, addi- 
tional analysts are more impactful if a ﬁrm had few ana- 
lysts to begin with. 
Fourth, if ITE increases investment- q sensitivity by loos- 
ening ﬁnancial constraints, the effects should be stronger 
in previously constrained ﬁrms. We identify such ﬁrms as 
either ﬁrms unable to raise much external ﬁnancing ( Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998 ) or small ﬁrms ( Bakke and Whited, 
2010 ). Using both measures, we ﬁnd that the effect of 
ITE in emerging countries is only signiﬁcant for less con- 
strained ﬁrms, inconsistent with the ﬁnancing channel but 
consistent with ITE increasing RPE, since less constrained 
ﬁrms are more able to respond to greater new information 
in prices. Note also that these cross-sectional tests further 
address the concern that our results are driven by FPE—for 
this to be the case, FPE must be correlated with not only 
ITE but also all of our splitting variables. 
Fifth, if the effect of ITE arises from correlation with 
general improvements to the ﬁnancial sector or gover- 
nance, then the announcement of insider trading laws 
might also coincide with such improvements and in- 
crease investment- q sensitivity. In contrast, Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) ﬁnd that the mere announcement, 
rather than enforcement, of insider trading laws does not 
reduce the cost of capital or increase stock liquidity, sug- 
gesting that it does not deter insider trading. Similarly, 
Bushman et al. (2005) ﬁnd that announcement does not 
increase analyst coverage. Thus, it does not change the 
source of information in prices and should not increase 
investment- q sensitivity, which is what we ﬁnd. 
Finally, we show that there are no differential changes 
in investment- q sensitivity between enforcers and non- 
enforcers in the years prior to ITE, addressing concerns 
that ITE was part of a general trend. A dynamic treatment 
analysis shows that, while the increase in investment- q 
sensitivity is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the 
year of ITE and the following year, it is signiﬁcant at the 
1% level from the second year onwards. This result is con- 
sistent with outsiders taking time to acquire information 
post-ITE. 
Our paper builds on a recent empirical literature show- 
ing that managers learn from prices when making real de- 
cisions. Chen et al. (2007) show that investment is par- 
ticularly sensitive to q for ﬁrms with more information 
in stock prices, measured by both price non-synchronicity 
and the probability of informed trading. They also note 
that q should only affect investment to the extent to 
which it captures information not previously known to the 
manager, and thus control for insider trading and earn- 
ings surprises, two measures of managerial information. 
Foucault and Frésard (2012) ﬁnd that investment- q sensi- 
tivity is higher in cross-listed ﬁrms, which have a wider 
set of outside investors, and the effect is stronger when 
cross-listing is more likely to trigger information new to 
A. Edmans et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 126 (2017) 74–96 77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Consistent with the corporate ﬁnance literature, we assume that the 
manager automatically has private information as a result of running the 
ﬁrm. If the manager has to bear a cost to acquire private information, it 
may seem that ITE will reduce his incentives to do so. However, if the 
manager has an incentive contract that aligns him with ﬁrm value (as the manager. Foucault and Frésard (2014) show that ﬁrms
learn from peer stock prices, particularly when managers
were previously uninformed, and thus peer stock prices
are more likely to contain new information. Luo (2005) ,
Bakke and Whited (2010) , and Edmans et al. (2012) also
provide evidence of managerial learning from prices. In ad-
dition to our theoretical model, we make two related em-
pirical contributions. First, correlations between price in-
formativeness and real decisions may result from omitted
variables. Prior studies recognize the endogeneity of price
informativeness and either show that the correlation is
stronger where learning is more likely and/or directly test
and refute alternative explanations. We identify a shock
to price informativeness which helps us move further to-
wards identifying causality. 4 Thus, independently of the
FPE/RPE distinction, we provide evidence that managers
learn from prices using a plausibly exogenous shock. Sec-
ond, our shock to price informativeness is a shock speciﬁ-
cally to outsider information in the stock price, rather than
total information. We can thus study the effect of ITE on
investment- q sensitivity while controlling for total infor-
mation, allowing us to more cleanly separate the effects
of FPE and RPE. The ﬁrst contribution allows us to demon-
strate a causal effect of price informativeness in general on
investment- q sensitivity; the second allows us to demon-
strate a causal effect of RPE in particular. 
Bai et al. (2016) also note the distinction between FPE
and RPE. They use the eﬃciency of real decisions (the pre-
dictability of cash ﬂows from investment, and the cross-
sectional dispersion of investment) to infer RPE, i.e., infer
from the rise in real eﬃciency that RPE must have risen. In
contrast, we study an event that is likely to increase RPE
on a priori grounds and then study the consequences of
this shock on real decisions. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the ef-
fects of insider trading on real eﬃciency, reviewed by
Bhattacharya (2014) . This literature typically focuses on
two channels. First, insider trading increases adverse se-
lection and thus reduces outsiders’ incentives to invest
in primary markets ( Leland, 1992 ), support real invest-
ment by the ﬁrm ( Manove, 1989 ), or engage in real invest-
ment themselves ( Ausubel, 1990 ). Second, insider trading
increases the extent to which an incumbent’s stock price
reﬂects industry prospects, and thus guides a newcomer’s
entry decision ( Fishman and Hagerty, 1992 ). In both chan-
nels, what matters is total information in prices (FPE). Our
paper argues that the real effects of insider trading depend
instead on how it affects new information in prices (RPE).
In contrast to this literature, insider and outsider informa-
tion are not substitutes. 
An independent paper by Chen et al. (2016) shares our
headline result that ITE increases investment- q sensitivity.
However, our papers address quite different research
questions. Our goal is to show that the impact of ﬁnancial
markets on real decisions depends not only on the total
amount of information in prices, but the source of this
information. In this context, we use ITE as a shock to4 Edmans et al. (2012) study a shock to the level of prices, rather than 
price informativeness. RPE that does not affect FPE. In contrast, their goal is
to study the impact of corporate transparency on capital
allocation eﬃciency, and use ITE as a shock to corporate
transparency. Their angle is more related to the total
price informativeness channel, as transparency is gener-
ally thought of as increasing total price informativeness.
These different research questions in turn lead to different
supplementary analyses. To isolate the learning channel,
we show that the sensitivity of investment to non-price
measures of investment opportunities is unchanged, and
that our effects are stronger in emerging countries, ﬁrms
with low prior analyst coverage, and industries where
outsiders’ information is more relevant for investment.
In contrast, their supplementary analyses study settings
in which corporate transparency is more likely to be
important, such as ﬁrms that are opaque or have agency
problems. In addition, we build a theoretical model to
demonstrate the impact of ITE on RPE and investment- q
sensitivity, and how this effect depends on the relevance
of outsider information for the investment decision. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and em-
pirical speciﬁcations, and Section 4 analyzes the results.
Section 5 details robustness tests and Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in Appendix A . 
2. The model 
Consider a publicly traded ﬁrm with assets in place
θ = θ1 + θ2 . The ﬁrm’s securities (normalized to zero) are
traded by three types of risk-neutral traders: multiple
outsiders (“she”), one insider (“he”), and liquidity traders
(“they”). There are three periods. At t = 1 , traders may ac-
quire information and trade. Outsider i can pay a ﬁxed
cost F to acquire information on assets in place. If she does
so, she privately observes the signal s i = θ1 + θ2 + ηi ; if
not, she remains uninformed and does not trade. Let “spec-
ulator” refer to an outsider who chooses to become in-
formed, a denote the number of speculators, and x i the
trade of speculator i . As in Fishman and Hagerty (1992) ,
we allow the number of speculators to be a continuous
variable to avoid integer issues. The insider is the ﬁrm’s
manager who costlessly and privately observes the signal
s M = θ1 , and trades y on his personal account. 5 The ran-
dom variables { θ1 , θ2 , ηi } are mutually independent and
normally distributed with zero means and precisions { h θ ,
h θ , h η}. 
6 This information structure captures the fact that
insiders and outsiders are informed about different dimen-
sions of assets in place. The variable θ1 ( θ2 ) represents
the component about which insiders (outsiders) have su-
perior information, such as internal information on ﬁrmin practice), he will wish to acquire information to guide his investment 
decision, and so ITE will have little effect on his private information. 
6 As in Goldstein and Yang (2015) , both components of assets in place 
are drawn from the same distribution and thus have the same precision, 
which signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analysis. 
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 proﬁtability (external information on industry prospects). 
Outsiders’ signal is imprecise due to the noise term ηi , and 
so they are less informed about θ1 than the insider, who 
has a perfect signal. 
Liquidity traders’ demands are exogenous and price- 
dependent. Let L (z, p) = z − 1 
λ
p denote their net market 
order, where z is normally distributed with mean zero 
and precision h z , and independent of all other random 
variables. The component − 1 
λ
p, where λ> 0, leads to 
a downward-sloping demand curve as in De Long et al. 
(1990) , Hellwig et al. (2005) , and Goldstein et al. (2013) . 
It means that liquidity trader demand L , and thus total 
demand d = ∑ a i =1 x i + y + z − 1 λ p, depends on the price, 
allowing the price to be determined by market clearing 
( d = 0 ). The higher λ is, the more the price p must change 
to maintain market clearing. We thus refer to λ as price 
impact. 
At t = 2 , the manager invests K units in a growth op- 
portunity at cost 1 2 cK 
2 , where c > 0. The proﬁtability of the 
growth opportunity is correlated with either θ1 or θ2 (or 
both). He chooses K to maximize expected ﬁrm value (as- 
sets in place, plus the growth opportunity, minus the cost 
of investment), based on his private signal s M and informa- 
tion inferred from the security price p : 
max 
K 
E 
⎡ ⎣ θ1 + θ2 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
assets in place 
+ ( (1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 ) K ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
growth opportunities 
− 1 
2 
cK 2 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
investment cost 
| s M , p 
⎤ ⎥ ⎦ , (1) 
where ω ∈ [0 , 1] determines the correlation between 
growth opportunities and each component of assets in 
place. An increase in ω raises the dependence of the in- 
vestment return on θ2 and thus the manager’s incentive to 
learn θ2 from the price. At t = 3 , all payoffs are realized. 
As in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Foucault 
and Gehrig (2008) , we consider securities that are a claim 
only to assets in place θ , rather than the sum of as- 
sets in place and growth opportunities. This substantially 
simpliﬁes the model because it means that the invest- 
ment decision is inﬂuenced by the security price, but the 
security price does not depend on the investment deci- 
sion. If the security were also a claim to the new in- 
vestment, its payoff, and thus price, would no longer be 
normally distributed, and the manager’s signal extraction 
problem becomes intractable. Our assumption is also sim- 
ilar to Fishman and Hagerty (1992) where a potential en- 
trant makes the investment decision, observing the stock 
price of an incumbent (whose value they assume to be un- 
affected by the entry decision). It also corresponds to the 
case in which a conglomerate has a publicly traded divi- 
sion, whose stock price informs the conglomerate’s invest- 
ment in another division. 7 7 Other learning models use other assumptions to avoid the intractabil- 
ity that arises if the security price also depends on the investment oppor- 
tunity. For example, Goldstein et al. (2013) assume that ﬁrm value is gross The equilibrium is deﬁned as follows: (i) A trad- 
ing strategy x (s i ) : R → R by each speculator that maxi-
mizes expected trading proﬁts x i (θ − p) , given the price 
function and the insider’s trading strategy; (ii) A trad- 
ing strategy y (s M ) : R → R by the insider that maximizes
expected trading proﬁts y (θ − p) , given the price func- 
tion and the strategy of speculators; (iii) A price function 
P (s M , { s i } a i =1 , z) : R a +2 → R that clears the security market;
(iv) An investment decision K(s M , p) : R 
2 → R by the man-
ager that maximizes expected ﬁrm value, given the equi- 
librium security price; and (v) all agents have rational ex- 
pectations in that each player’s belief about the other play- 
ers’ strategies is correct in equilibrium. 
Before solving the model, we discuss its assumptions. 
First, the model does not require the manager to have no 
signal about θ2 , nor even a less precise signal than spec- 
ulators. It only requires him to have an imperfect signal 
of θ2 (we feature no signal for simplicity), and outsiders 
to have some information on θ2 , so that he has an incen- 
tive to learn from the price. Second, outsiders and the in- 
sider have correlated signals, so that they compete and so 
insider trading reduces outsiders’ incentives to become in- 
formed. Here, this correlation arises since s M and s i share 
the common component θ1 . We do not require the insider 
to be perfectly informed on the common signal θ1 ; the re- 
sults would continue to hold if he had a noisy signal, and 
even if his signal were less precise than outsiders’. This 
common signal could alternatively be on θ2 , i.e., outsiders 
could have no signal on θ1 , and the insider a (noisy) signal 
on θ2 in addition to θ1 . 
2.1. Equilibrium 
We consider two variants of the model, one in which 
insider trading is allowed and one in which it is prohibited. 
Let a ′ denote the number of speculators when insider trad- 
ing is prohibited. Taking as given a ( a ′ ), Lemmas 1 (2) give
equilibrium trades and security prices for the cases in 
which insider trading is allowed (prohibited). 
Lemma 1 . There is a unique security market equilibrium with 
insider trading in which: 
1. Outsiders’ demand is given by x i = d x s i , where d x = 
3 h η
4 λh θ+ λ(3 a +4) h η . 
2. Insider demand is given by y = d y s M , where d y = 
2(h η+ h θ ) 
4 λh θ+ λ(3 a +4) h η . 
3. The security price satisﬁes p = λ( ∑ a i =1 x i + y + z) . 
Lemma 2 . There is a unique security market equilibrium 
without insider trading in which: 
1. Outsiders’ demand is given by x ′ 
i 
= d ′ x s i , where d ′ x = 
h η
λ( h θ+(a ′ +1) h η) 
. 
2. Insider demand is given by y ′ = 0 . 
3. The security price satisﬁes p ′ = λ
(∑ a ′ x ′ + y ′ + z ). i =1 i 
of the investment cost, and Leland (1992) assumes that the returns from 
investment go entirely to new shareholders, not existing ones. 
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8 In the limit as h p → 0, because either a , h η , or h z go to zero, the learn- 
ing effect term disappears. Then the manager cannot learn any valuable 
information about θ2 from the security price, and so investment is uncor- 
related with θ2 . 
9 Note that d ′ x = d x : speculators’ trading aggressiveness is unchanged, 
since the exit of the insider is exactly offset by the entry of the new spec- 
ulators. Thus, they face the same competition as before, and so trade with 
the same intensity. All other variables in Eq. (4) are exogenous. The above lemmas are as in standard insider trading
models and so we defer the intuition to Appendix A . More
speciﬁc to our framework are the optimal investment level
K , its sensitivity to the security price βKp ≡ Cov ( K,p ) Var(p) , ex-
pected ﬁrm value (a measure of real eﬃciency), and our
two price eﬃciency measures. FPE is the extent to which
the security price can forecast its actual payoff θ = θ1 + θ2 ,
i.e., Var −1 (θ1 + θ2 | p) . RPE is the extent to which the price
provides information over and above the manager’s ex-
isting signal s M , i.e., Var 
−1 (θ1 + θ2 | s M , p) . Lemma 3 gives
these quantities for the case of insider trading; the case
of no insider trading is analogous. 
Lemma 3 . In the security market equilibrium with insider
trading, we have the following: 
1. Firm investment is given by 
K = 1 
c 
(
(1 − ω) θ1 + ω 
h p 
h θ + h p 
s p 
)
, (2)
where s p ≡
1 
λ
p−y 
ad x 
− θ1 = θ2 + 1 a 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z ad x is an unbi-
ased signal of θ2 with precision h p ≡ d 
2 
x a 
2 h ηh z 
h η+ d 2 x ah z 
. 
2. Forecasting price eﬃciency is given by 
FPE ≡ 1 
Var (θ1 + θ2 | p) = 
1 
Var ( θ ) 
(
1 − ρ2 
θ,p 
) (3)
= 
4 h θ
(
h ηh θ + 2 d 2 x a 2 h ηh z + d 2 x ah θh z + 2 d y d x ah ηh z + d 2 y h ηh z 
)
2 h ηh θ + 2 d 2 x ah θh z + d 2 y h ηh z 
3. Revelatory price eﬃciency is given by 
RPE ≡ 1 
Var (θ1 + θ2 | s M , p) = h p . (4)
4. Expected ﬁrm value is given by 
V = 1 
2 c 
(
1 − 2 ω + 2 ω 2 
h θ
− ω 
2 
h p 
)
. (5)
5. Investment-price sensitivity is given by 
βKp = Cov ( K, p ) 
V ar(p) 
= (1 − ω) 
c 
Cov ( θ1 , p ) 
V ar ( p ) 
+ ω 
c 
√ 
1 
h θV ar ( p ) 
− 1 
h p V ar ( p ) 
, (6)
where 
Cov (θ1 , p) = 
d y + ad x 
h θ
. (7)
The intuition is as follows. The optimal investment level
K is proportional to the manager’s conditional expectation
of the investment return (1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 . This expectation
depends partially on s p , an unbiased signal of θ2 learned
from the price p , which has precision h p . Turning to RPE,
interestingly, it equals the precision of the price signal h p .
Even though these are somewhat different concepts (RPE
concerns the precision of information on the overall in-
vestment opportunity θ1 + θ2 and the price signal concerns
only the precision of θ2 ), they are mathematically iden-
tical since the insider already knows θ1 . This result sug-
gests that the importance of prices for investment dependson RPE, since it equals the amount of information on θ2
that the manager can learn from the price. In contrast,
FPE is a quite different concept and not related to h p . Ex-
pected ﬁrm value is increasing in RPE (for any ω > 0) and
unrelated to FPE; all other variables are exogenous. Thus,
Lemma 3 provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for RPE as the
relevant measure of price eﬃciency, as argued verbally by
Bond et al. (2012) . 
Finally, investment-price sensitivity βKp arises from two
sources of covariance between investment K and the se-
curity price p . The ﬁrst is the “trading effect” and given
by Cov (θ1 , p) : if the manager receives a high signal θ1 ,
he invests more (if ω < 1) and also buys securities (if in-
sider trading is allowed), increasing the price; since out-
siders’ signal is correlated with θ1 , they also buy. Thus,
investment-price sensitivity can arise even if the manager
did not learn from prices—i.e., even if ﬁnancial markets
had no real effects. The magnitude of the trading effect
depends on the number of insiders (1) and trading ag-
gressiveness ( d y ), plus the number of speculators ( a ) and
their trading aggressiveness ( d x ), as in (7) . The second is
the “learning effect” : when the price is high, the manager
infers that θ2 is high and invests more. Importantly, the
magnitude of the learning effect is increasing in RPE ( h p ). 
8
2.2. The effect of insider trading enforcement 
We now analyze the effect of ITE on the equilibrium.
Lemma 4 starts with its impact on the number of specula-
tors, FPE, and RPE. 
Lemma 4 . ITE increases the number of speculators by 1 3 (1 +
h θ
h η
) , and thus increases RPE. The change in FPE has the same
sign as 2 h η − h θ , which may be positive or negative. 
The intuition is as follows. ITE reduces competition
from insiders and thus encourages more outsiders to
gather information. This greater number of speculators a
in turn increases RPE from Eq. (4) . 9 In contrast, the effect
on FPE is ambiguous, because FPE depends not only on the
amount of outsider information in the price (as with RPE)
but also the amount of insider information. While the for-
mer rises post-ITE, the latter falls. The overall effect de-
pends on which dominates, and thus the underlying pa-
rameters; as discussed previously, Fernandes and Ferreira
(2009) ﬁnd that FPE is constant in emerging countries and
rises in developed ones. In sum, ITE satisﬁes the require-
ment for a shock that increases RPE but may not change
FPE. 
The rise in the number of speculators, 1 3 (1 + 
h θ
h η
) is in-
creasing in h θ and decreasing in h η , because high h θ and
low h η increase speculators’ trading aggressiveness d x (see
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11 We have veriﬁed that the results are robust to different end dates. 
One possibility is to include as much data as possible and end in 2015. 
However, this end date is quite distant from the last enforcement date, 
1998. Another possibility is to end in 2003, which is ﬁve years after the 
last enforcement date. However, we wish the sample to cover not only 
upturns but also economic downturns, and thus end in 2009, to include 
the 2007–8 ﬁnancial crisis. In Section 5.2 we show that the results are 
robust to studying a narrow window around ITE dates. Lemma 1 ). Intuitively, the extra proﬁt that becomes avail- 
able post-ITE can accommodate fewer new speculators if 
these new speculators trade aggressively. The increase in 
the number of speculators (and thus RPE) will thus be 
greater in ﬁrms about which speculators have a smaller 
information advantage. Indeed, Bushman et al. (2005) ﬁnd 
that outside information acquisition rises more in emerg- 
ing countries post-ITE, potentially because outsiders’ sig- 
nals are noisier in such countries. 
Armed with Lemma 4 , we can now analyze the effect 
of ITE on investment-price sensitivity. This is given by 
Proposition 1 , which forms the main prediction for our em- 
pirical tests. 
Proposition 1 . ITE increases real eﬃciency for any ω > 0 . The 
increase in investment-price sensitivity post-ITE, β ′ 
K ′ p ′ − βKp , 
is increasing in ω. There exists ω ∈ (0 , 1) such that the in- 
crease is positive if and only if ω ≥ ω . 
The intuition is as follows. ITE has opposite effects on 
the trading and learning effects in Eq. (6) . First, it leads 
to d ′ y = 0 and C ov (θ1 , p ′ ) < C ov (θ1 , p) , weakening the trad-
ing effect and thus decreasing βKp . Intuitively, the insider 
no longer buys and increases the security price when he 
invests. Second, it increases RPE ( Lemma 4 ), strengthening 
the learning effect and thus raising βKp . Intuitively, ITE re- 
duces competition by insiders and thus increases informa- 
tion acquisition by outsiders. Prices contain more infor- 
mation that is not known to the manager, and so his in- 
vestment decision responds more strongly to the security 
price. 
The trading effect is increasing in 1 − ω, the importance 
of the manager’s signal (which he trades on) for his invest- 
ment decision. The learning effect is increasing in ω, the 
importance of speculators’ signal (which he learns from 
prices). Thus, if and only if ω is suﬃciently high, ITE in- 
creases βKp . 
10 In contrast, ITE increases real eﬃciency for 
any ω > 0. This is because real eﬃciency depends only on 
the learning effect and not the trading effect—since the 
manager uses his signal on θ1 regardless, the extent to 
which it is incorporated in prices does not matter. ITE al- 
ways has a positive learning effect, and it does not matter 
for real eﬃciency whether it is outweighed by the negative 
learning effect (i.e., ω is small). We do not test the im- 
pact of ITE on real eﬃciency as it can occur through many 
channels other than learning—for example, Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) show that ITE reduces the cost of cap- 
ital and Bushman et al. (2005) show that it affects analyst 
coverage (in turn, Derrien and Kecskés, 2013 show that an- 
alyst coverage has real effects). 
The above model considers a single ﬁrm at a single 
point in time, and so the investment- q sensitivity coeﬃ- 
cient βKp captures the hypothetical link between invest- 
ment and prices for different realizations of the model, 
which in turn correspond to different realizations of the 
random variables. The model’s results also apply to both 10 ITE has a third effect on βKp : in addition to changing the nu- 
merator Cov ( K, p ) via the trading and learning effects, it also changes 
the denominator Var ( p ). However, rearranging (3) yields Var(p) = 
2 ( h θ +(3 a +1) h η ) 2 
(1 −FPE −1 ) h θ ( 4 h θ +(3 a +4) h η ) 2 
. Thus, the effect on Var ( p ) is independent of ω. cross-sectional investment- q sensitivity for multiple ﬁrms 
at a given point in time, and time-series investment- q 
sensitivity for a given ﬁrm across multiple periods. Start- 
ing with the former, the greater the new information in 
stock prices, the greater the extent to which managers 
of different ﬁrms will be basing their investment lev- 
els on their respective stock prices, thus increasing cross- 
sectional investment- q sensitivity. This result echoes Bai 
et al. (2016) who use the cross-sectional standard devi- 
ation in predicted earnings from investment as a mea- 
sure of economic eﬃciency—if prices are totally uninfor- 
mative, ﬁrms will all invest at the same level regardless 
of prices; the more informative prices are, the greater 
the cross-sectional dispersion in investment (and thus pre- 
dicted earnings from investment). Moving to the latter, the 
greater the new information in stock prices, the greater the 
extent to which a single manager will vary his investment 
level around the ﬁrm mean, based on how the stock price 
varies around the ﬁrm mean. 
3. Data and empirical approach 
This section describes our data sources, the calculation 
of the variables used in the empirical analysis, and our re- 
gression speciﬁcations. 
3.1. Sample and sources 
We take ITE dates hand-collected by Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) , stock prices from Datastream, ﬁnancial data 
from Worldscope, and country-level macroeconomic vari- 
ables from the World Bank’s World Development Indica- 
tors (WDI) database. We begin with the 48 countries in 
Worldscope studied by Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) and 
use their start date of 1980; we end in 2009. 11 We mea- 
sure investment as of the following year, and so study it 
from 1981–2010. Since our two-stage analysis estimates 
investment- q sensitivity for each country-year, we require 
countries to have data on at least 100 ﬁrms in each 
year. Our ﬁnal sample comprises 328,588 ﬁrm-year obser- 
vations on 43,006 unique ﬁrms that span 552 country- 
years, 40 nonﬁnancial industries, and 39 countries out of 
which 27 enforced insider trading laws between 1980 and 
2009 (“enforcers”), seven had not enforced by 2009 (“non- 
enforcers”), and ﬁve had enforced prior to 1980 (“already- 
enforcers”). 12 We divide these countries into emerging and 12 We start with 351,493 nonﬁnancial observations for the 48 countries 
identiﬁed in Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) . The requirement of 100 ﬁrms 
per year reduces us to 39 countries and 328,594 observations. Our results 
are unaffected by this restriction: without it, our key coeﬃcient of inter- 
est (on Q × ITE ) remains positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. We lose 
six observations without an industry aﬃliation, leading to a ﬁnal sample 
of 328,588 observations. 
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Table 1 
List of countries. 
The list of ﬁrst-time enforcers and non-enforcers is from Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) . ITE year (ITA year) denotes the year of ﬁrst-time en- 
forcement (announcement) of insider trading laws. Firm-years denotes 
the number of ﬁrm-year observations on Worldscope within each coun- 
try, while Country-years represents the number of country-year (pre- 
dicted) observations of investment- q sensitivity. Countries with fewer 
than 100 observations per year are excluded from both samples. The sam- 
ple period is 1981–2010. Emerging countries are denoted by an asterisk 
( ∗). 
Country ITE year ITA year Firm-years Country-years 
Australia 1996 1991 14,277 21 
Belgium 1994 1990 322 3 
Brazil ∗ 1978 1976 322 3 
Canada 1976 1966 20,247 25 
Chile ∗ 1996 1981 1,605 11 
China – 1993 14,085 13 
Denmark 1996 1991 1,969 17 
Finland 1993 1989 1,115 10 
France 1975 1967 10,416 22 
Germany 1995 1994 13,526 22 
Greece ∗ 1996 1988 1,216 5 
Hong Kong 1994 1991 10,0 0 0 18 
India ∗ 1998 1992 11,902 18 
Indonesia ∗ 1996 1991 3,512 15 
Israel ∗ 1989 1981 2,018 6 
Italy 1996 1991 3,123 21 
Japan 1990 1988 42,967 30 
Malaysia ∗ 1996 1973 10,228 19 
Mexico ∗ – 1975 203 2 
Netherlands 1994 1989 2,652 20 
New Zealand – 1988 533 5 
Norway 1990 1985 1,710 13 
Pakistan ∗ – 1995 621 5 
Peru ∗ 1994 1991 100 1 
Philippines ∗ – 1982 1,785 11 
Poland ∗ 1993 1991 1,341 7 
Russia ∗ – 1996 859 4 
Singapore 1978 1973 5,998 16 
South Africa ∗ – 1989 4,062 18 
South Korea ∗ 1988 1976 12,195 17 
Spain 1998 1994 1,567 14 
Sri Lanka ∗ 1996 1987 701 5 
Sweden 1990 1971 3,458 15 
Switzerland 1995 1988 2,687 17 
Thailand ∗ 1993 1984 8,741 19 
Turkey ∗ 1996 1981 1,563 9 
UK 1981 1980 29,443 30 
USA 1961 1934 74,141 29 
Total 328, 588 552 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
The sample comprises 328,588 ﬁrm-year observations on 43,006 unique 
ﬁrms that span 39 countries and 40 nonﬁnancial industries over 1980–
2009. Detailed variable deﬁnitions are in Appendix B . 
Variable Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
AGE 328,588 11.112 9.0 0 0 7.881 1.0 0 0 36.0 0 0 
CASH 328,588 0.168 0.100 0.193 0.0 0 0 0.902 
CF 328,588 −0.005 0.075 0.418 −2.999 0.393 
FSRV 324,423 0.665 0.675 0.070 0.441 0.940 
GDP ($) 317,263 9.801 10.267 1.137 5.628 11.4 4 4 
GDPGROW (%) 317,263 2.207 2.109 3.172 −14.321 13.605 
INFL (%) 317,263 2.571 2.192 3.614 −6.663 75.271 
INV 328,588 0.072 0.036 0.111 0.0 0 0 0.728 
LEV 328,588 0.133 0.066 0.172 0.0 0 0 0.842 
ME ($m) 328,588 4.516 4.421 1.948 0.652 9.4 4 4 
NZRET 324,423 0.942 1.0 0 0 0.126 0.250 1.0 0 0 
Q 328,588 2.298 1.267 4.199 0.411 34.817 
RETAINED 291,769 −1.114 0.059 5.491 −43.918 0.713 
SGR 276,486 0.187 0.070 0.687 −0.908 4.921 
TRADE 317,263 0.397 0.331 0.295 0.127 1.514 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 developed following the classiﬁcation of Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002) . 
Table 1 presents the list of our sample countries and
the year in which they ﬁrst enforced insider trading laws.
We also tabulate the year when insider trading laws are
ﬁrst announced, which we use in Section 5.1 as a falsiﬁ-
cation test. The ﬁnal two columns present the number of
ﬁrm-year and country-year observations. Table 2 provides
summary statistics. The median investment rate, deﬁned as
capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets, is 3.6%.
The median Tobin’s q , the ratio of market value of assets
(market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided
by book value of assets, is 1.267. Market equity for the me-
dian ﬁrm is $83 million. 3.2. Hypotheses, variable construction, and regression 
speciﬁcations 
Our hypothesis is that, as predicted by Proposition 1 , ITE
increases investment- q sensitivity if outside information
is suﬃciently important. We test this hypothesis using a
difference-in-differences approach that compares changes
in investment- q sensitivity before and after ITE for treated
countries (enforcers) to control countries. These control
countries include not only non-enforcers, but also coun-
tries that previously enforced these laws and those that
will subsequently enforce these laws. For example, to iden-
tify the effect of ITE on investment- q sensitivity for Bel-
gium (that enforced insider trading laws in 1994), we im-
plicitly compare Belgium’s changes in investment- q sensi-
tivity to four sets of controls—non-enforcers (e.g., China),
already-enforcers (e.g., France), enforcers during our sam-
ple period before 1994 (e.g., Norway), and enforcers dur-
ing our sample period after 1994 (e.g., Italy). The staggered
enforcement across the 27 enforcers means that our iden-
tiﬁcation comes from several events scattered over time,
which attenuates (but does not eliminate) concerns that
one particular event may be correlated with unobservable
factors that also drive investment- q sensitivity. We imple-
ment our approach in three ways, which we now describe.
3.2.1. Single-stage speciﬁcation 
Our main speciﬁcation is a single-stage, ﬁrm-level re-
gression, given by Eq. (8) below: 
INV i,c,t+1 = β1 Country c + β2 Year t + β3 IT E c,t + β4 Q i,c,t 
+ β5 Q i,c,t ×Country c + β6 Q i,c,t × Year t 
+ β7 Q i,c,t × IT E c,t + β8 CF i,c,t + β9 CF i,c,t 
×C ountry c + β10 C F i,c,t × Year t + β11 C F i,c,t 
× IT E c,t + β12 CT RY _ CT RL + ε i,c,t . (8)
INV i,c,t+1 represents investment for ﬁrm i headquartered
in country c during year t + 1 . Country is a vector of coun-
try indicators and Year is a vector of year indicators. ITE is
an indicator that equals one on or after ITE for enforcers,
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forcers pre-ITE. 
A standard difference-in-differences framework studies 
the effect of an event on a level variable. In our context, 
this would equate to studying the impact of ITE on invest- 
ment, i.e., the coeﬃcient β3 . The standalone ﬁxed effects 
Country and Year capture between-country and across-year 
differences in investment, and so β3 captures the increase 
in investment in enforcing countries post-ITE, over and 
above any change in other countries and controlling for the 
average level of investment within each country. 
However, in our setting, we are interested not in a 
level variable, but in a slope coeﬃcient—investment- q sen- 
sitivity. The standalone ﬁxed effects only capture differ- 
ences in the level of investment, not investment- q sensitiv- 
ity. We thus add the interactions Q ×Country and Q ×Year 
to capture between-country and across-year differences in 
investment- q sensitivity. As a result, the coeﬃcient β7 cap- 
tures the increase in investment- q sensitivity in enforcers 
as a result of ITE, controlling for between-country dif- 
ferences and time trends. To our knowledge, Eq. (8) is 
the ﬁrst to extend the standard difference-in-differences 
framework to a setting in which the outcome of interest 
is not a level variable but a slope coeﬃcient. 13 
While Q is a price-based measure of a ﬁrm’s invest- 
ment opportunities, CF (cash ﬂow, deﬁned as operating 
earnings plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by to- 
tal assets) is a non-price-based measure. We similarly in- 
teract CF with Country , Year , and ITE indicators to allow 
us to study whether investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity in- 
creases around ITE. C T RY _ C T RL is a vector of country-level 
controls. These are macroeconomic variables that capture 
economic growth and bilateral trade, which could be cor- 
related with the decision to enforce insider trading laws 
and also drive investment. These variables are log Gross 
Domestic Product per capita ( GDP ), annual growth in GDP 
per capita ( GDPGROW ), annual inﬂation ( INFL ), and global 
trade ( TRADE ), deﬁned as the log of exports plus imports 
scaled by annual GDP. Detailed variable deﬁnitions are 
in Appendix B . In our main speciﬁcation, we do not in- 
clude additional ﬁrm-level controls, since ﬁrm-level vari- 
ables may be affected by ITE, as found by Bushman et al. 
(2005) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) . As Roberts and 
Whited (2012) argue, “any covariates included as controls 
must be unaffected by the treatment.” However, we will 
include additional ﬁrm-level controls as a robustness check 
in Section 5 . 14 
The null hypothesis is that β7 = 0 , i.e., that investment- 
q sensitivity is unaffected by ITE. This hypothesis would 
hold in two scenarios. First, we have a “weak event” —
ITE does not have a signiﬁcant effect on insider trading or 
outsiders’ incentives to gather information, so that we re- 13 A number of papers, e.g., Gormley et al. (2012) and Gormley et al. 
(2013) study a difference-in-differences on a slope coeﬃcient with ﬁxed 
effects. We interact both year and country ﬁxed effects with the indepen- 
dent variable in the regression slope ( Q , in our case) to capture between- 
country and across-year differences in this slope. 
14 We include cash ﬂow as the only control to test whether investment 
becomes more sensitive to non-price measures of investment opportuni- 
ties, which would not be consistent with the learning channel. main in Lemma 1 and all variables are unchanged. Second, 
the event is not weak, and the manager learns from prices, 
but the extent to which he does depends on total informa- 
tion (FPE) rather than RPE. This would arise if the man- 
ager did not have a signal on θ1 and instead the insider 
were separate from the manager (e.g., a director or block- 
holder). We consider this model in Appendix C . In this case, 
the manager seeks to learn all information from the stock 
price, and it is FPE that matters for investment- q sensitiv- 
ity. Then, β7 = 0 would arise either if FPE is unchanged af- 
ter ITE (which Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009 ﬁnd is the case 
for emerging countries) or the regression controls for FPE. 
Our hypothesis is that β7 > 0. This hypothesis requires 
two conditions to hold: the manager learns suﬃciently 
from prices because they contain information relevant for 
investment ( ω > ω ), and the extent to which he learns 
depends on RPE, not FPE (since he already has a signal 
θ1 ). While the former condition (learning in general) has 
been shown by prior literature, cleanly identifying the lat- 
ter (that learning depends on information in prices not 
known to the manager) is the focus of this paper. We call 
this the “RPE hypothesis.”
An alternative hypothesis is that outsider information is 
not suﬃciently relevant for prices ( ω < ω ), in which case 
the correlation between investment and q stems primarily 
from the trading effect. This alternative hypothesis would 
predict β7 < 0, since ITE weakens the trading effect. 
While ﬁnding that β7 > 0 would support the RPE hy- 
pothesis, it would also be consistent with ITE leading 
to ﬁrms responding more to investment opportunities in 
general (rather than just to price-based measures of in- 
vestment opportunities)—perhaps because ITE is correlated 
with improvements in capital markets, which facilitate the 
ﬁnancing of investment, or improvements in governance, 
which induce the manager to respond more to invest- 
ment signals. Thus, we wish to show that investment does 
not also become more sensitive to cash ﬂow post-ITE. We 
therefore predict that β11 is non-positive. 
We estimate Eq. (8) at the ﬁrm level, including indus- 
try and year ﬁxed effects. Our baseline speciﬁcation ex- 
cludes ﬁrm ﬁxed effects for two reasons. First, Roberts and 
Whited (2012) argue that, since investment is the ﬁrst dif- 
ference of capital stock, the ﬁxed effect has already been 
differenced out of the regression and so adding it reduces 
eﬃciency. Second, as discussed in Section 2 , our model 
has implications for both time-series and cross-sectional 
investment- q sensitivity. In alternative speciﬁcations, we 
include additional ﬁxed effects. First, we replace industry 
ﬁxed effects with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects to address the con- 
cern that investment may vary across ﬁrms for reasons 
other than differences in q ; for example, one ﬁrm may sys- 
tematically be ﬁnancially constrained or risk-averse. There 
is a trade-off as ﬁrm ﬁxed effects remove cross-sectional 
investment- q sensitivity and focus on time-series sensi- 
tivity, so this speciﬁcation can be viewed as more con- 
servative. The next speciﬁcation in Section 3.2.2 will fo- 
cus on cross-sectional investment- q sensitivity. Second, our 
most stringent speciﬁcation includes country-year as well 
as ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, i.e., two-dimensional ﬁxed effects 
as recommended by Gormley and Matsa (2014) . We in- 
clude country-year ﬁxed effects to attenuate (although 
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15 They write “a key feature of [the insider trading] literature is that the 
marginal (informed) investor will trade on new (or accumulated) informa- 
tion not reﬂected in the price of a security only if the trade yields a proﬁt 
net of transaction costs. The cost of transacting constitutes a threshold 
that must be exceeded before a security’s return will reﬂect new infor- 
mation.”not eliminate) the concern that ITE is endogenous: coun-
tries’ decision to enforce insider trading laws could be
correlated with unobservable country-level, time-varying
macroeconomic factors that drive investment. As suggested
by Bertrand et al. (2004) , we cluster standard errors at the
country level. 
3.2.2. Two-stage speciﬁcation 
While the single-stage speciﬁcation treats every ﬁrm-
year observation equally, one potential drawback is that
the results may be skewed by a small number of coun-
tries with many ﬁrms. We thus now study two two-stage
speciﬁcations where the analysis is at the country level
and thus weights each country equally. Our ﬁrst two-stage
speciﬁcation is given below: 
INV i,c,t+1 = αc,t + βQ c,t Q i,c,t + βCF c,t CF i,c,t + ε i,c,t+1 (9)
and ̂ βQ c,t = γ1 Country c + γ2 Year t + γ3 IT E c,t 
+ γ4 C T RY _ C T RL c,t + ε c,t . (10)
This analysis focuses on how cross-sectional investment-
q sensitivity changes for a particular country after ITE.
The ﬁrst stage ( Eq. (9) ) is a ﬁrm-level regression that es-
timates cross-sectional investment- q sensitivities ̂ βQ c,t in a
given country-year. The second stage is a country-level
regression that regresses these (predicted) investment- q
sensitivities on ITE , country and year ﬁxed effects, and
country-level controls — similar to a standard generalized
difference-in-differences. We cluster standard errors at the
country level. Our hypothesis is that γ 3 > 0, i.e. cross-
sectional investment- q sensitivity, for a particular country
in a given year, rises after that country enforces insider
trading laws. 
While Eqs. (9) and (10) represent a two-stage analy-
sis at the country-year level, focusing on cross-sectional
investment- q sensitivity, we can also conduct a two-stage
analysis at a country-period level: 
INV i,c,p,t+1 = αc,p + βQ c,p Q i,c,p,t + βCF c,p CF i,c,p,t + ε i,c,p,t+1 (11)
and ̂ βQ c,p = α + δIT E c,p + ε c,p , (12)
where the p subscript corresponds to a period. There are
two periods, pre-ITE and post-ITE, and the analysis is re-
stricted to enforcers. Thus, the ﬁrst stage ( Eq. (11) ) es-
timates investment- q sensitivity for a country either in
the pre-ITE period or the post-ITE period. Pre-ITE (post-
ITE) investment- q sensitivity captures both time-series and
cross-sectional investment- q sensitivity for that country
before (after) enforcement. The second stage regresseŝ βQ c,p on an ITE indicator to study whether the country’s
investment- q sensitivity rose post-ITE. 
In short, the country-year analysis studies the time se-
ries of a cross-section, analyzing whether cross-sectional
investment- q sensitivity rises post-ITE. The country-period
analysis studies the time series of a panel, analyzing
whether panel investment- q sensitivity rises post-ITE. 4. Results 
4.1. Full sample 
Table 3 presents results of the single-stage speciﬁcation.
The regression in column 1 has Q , CF , and their inter-
actions with Year , Country , and ITE as explanatory vari-
ables. We ﬁnd that ITE leads to an increase in investment-
q sensitivity that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Column 2
adds country-level controls and column 3 then replaces
industry ﬁxed effects with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects; the results
are unchanged. Column 4 is our most stringent speciﬁ-
cation which includes country-year as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects; the former subsume the country-level controls.
The coeﬃcient on Q × ITE is now signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the average of the
Q ×Country interactions is 0.559 while that of the Q ×Year
interactions is −2 . 791 (untabulated). Thus, the benchmark
investment- q sensitivity is 3.279 (the coeﬃcient on Q )
+0 . 559 − 2 . 791 = 1 . 047 . The coeﬃcient of 0.402 on Q × ITE
thus corresponds to a 38% increase. This result is econom-
ically signiﬁcant but also plausible. For example, Foucault
and Frésard (2012) ﬁnd that cross-listing leads to a dou-
bling of investment- q sensitivity, suggesting that learning
effects can be substantial. In all four columns, the coeﬃ-
cient on CF × ITE is insigniﬁcantly negative, and so the in-
crease in investment- q sensitivity is not part of a general
trend of investment becoming more responsive to invest-
ment opportunities in general. 
While the results of Table 3 are supportive of the RPE
hypothesis, they could also be consistent with FPE, rather
than RPE, increasing post-enforcement. Table 4 investigates
this concern in two ways ( Section 4.2 will later do so in a
third way). First, it adds controls for both FPE and its in-
teraction with Q . We use two measures of FPE, both de-
ﬁned at the ﬁrm-year level. The ﬁrst is FSRV , ﬁrm-speciﬁc
return variation, as used by Chen et al. (2007) . We regress
ﬁrm-level monthly stock returns on value-weighted local
market excess returns and US market excess returns, and
calculate the log of one minus the R -squared of this regres-
sion. The second is NZRET , the fraction of trading days in a
year with nonzero returns. Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that
a high fraction of zero-return days indicates high trans-
action costs, which reduce investors’ incentives to both
gather and trade on information, likely decreasing price in-
formativeness. 15 
Column 1 adds FSRV and Q × FSRV as additional con-
trols. In column 2, we discretize FSRV to address con-
cerns that this measure is potentially noisy. Speciﬁcally, we
split FSRV into per-country terciles and deﬁne F SRV _ LO and
F SRV _ HI as indicator variables indicating the bottom and
top terciles, respectively. We include these indicators in-
dependently and interacted with Q . Columns 3 and 4 in-
stead include continuous and discrete measures of NZRET ,
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Table 3 
Investment- Q sensitivity after ITE: single-stage speciﬁcation. 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). All variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are 
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any 
term containing Q has been multiplied by 100. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ITE −0.006 −0.004 −0.006 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
Q 3.521 3.231 2.994 3.279 
[0.482] ∗∗∗ [0.630] ∗∗∗ [0.347] ∗∗∗ [0.563] ∗∗∗
Q × ITE 0.433 0.438 0.375 0.402 
[0.186] ∗∗ [0.183] ∗∗ [0.147] ∗∗ [0.130] ∗∗∗
CF 0.181 0.196 0.173 0.135 
[0.034] ∗∗∗ [0.034] ∗∗∗ [0.017] ∗∗∗ [0.027] ∗∗∗
CF × ITE −0.036 −0.038 −0.028 −0.004 
[0.030] [0.028] [0.021] [0.023] 
GDP 0.004 −0.004 
[0.007] [0.009] 
GDPGROW 0.160 0.125 
[0.060] ∗∗ [0.069] ∗
INFL 0.020 0.001 
[0.026] [0.023] 
TRADE 0.002 −0.004 
[0.027] [0.028] 
Adjusted R 2 0.15 0.15 0.41 0.50 
Observations 328,588 317,263 317,263 328,588 
Country , Year , and interactions 
with Q and CF 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional ﬁxed effects Industry Industry Firm Firm, country-year 
 respectively. In column 4, the coeﬃcient on Q × NZRET _ LO 
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the coef- 
ﬁcient on Q × NZRET _ HI is positive and signiﬁcant at the 
1% level. These results suggest that investment- q sensitiv- 
ity is higher in ﬁrms with greater total price informative- 
ness. Thus, the Chen et al. (2007) result, initially discovered 
for the US, continues to hold in an international context 
– at least when measuring investment- q sensitivity with 
NZRET and discretizing it to address potential mismeasure- 
ment. 16 Despite controlling for FPE, Q × ITE is positive and 
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all speciﬁcations, suggesting 
that investment- q sensitivity depends not only on total in- 
formation in prices, but also the source of this information. 
The coeﬃcient on CF × ITE is insigniﬁcantly negative in all 
speciﬁcations. 
The second way to address concerns that our results 
are driven by FPE is to decompose our ITE indicator into 
I T E _ EM ( I T E _ DV ), indicators for whether an emerging (de- 
veloped) country enforced insider trading laws. Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2009) ﬁnd that FPE does not rise in emerging 
countries post-ITE, while it rises in developed ones. In ad- 
dition, Bushman et al. (2005) ﬁnd that analyst coverage in- 
creases post-ITE in emerging but not developed countries, 
suggesting that RPE increases in the former. They argue 
that this differential effect arises because there is greater 
opacity in emerging countries and thus more private infor- 
mation to trade on. Thus, the RPE hypothesis predicts that 
investment- q sensitivity should rise for emerging countries 16 In column 2, the coeﬃcient on Q × F SRV _ HI is insigniﬁcant, but 
that on Q × F SRV _ LO is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We do 
not make strong inferences from this result as it disappears when we 
split FSRV into terciles based on the entire sample (rather than within- 
country). The signiﬁcance of Q × ITE continues to hold under both speciﬁ- 
cations. 
 in particular. Column 5 controls for discretized FSRV and 
column 6 controls for discretized NZRET . In both columns, 
the increase in investment- q sensitivity is signiﬁcant at the 
1% level in emerging countries and at the 5% level in de- 
veloped countries. The difference in coeﬃcients is signiﬁ- 
cant at the 1% level. The change in investment-cash ﬂow 
sensitivity is insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. 
Table 5.A concerns the two-stage speciﬁcations; for 
brevity, we only report the results of the second stage. In 
columns 1–3 we analyze the model of Eqs. (9) and (10) . 
The ﬁrst stage is a country-year cross-sectional analysis 
of investment- q sensitivity, and the second stage regresses 
these predicted investment- q sensitivities on ITE indicators 
and country and year ﬁxed effects. In this second stage, we 
also wish to control for FPE to ensure that any increase in 
investment- q sensitivities around ITE is not due to changes 
in FPE. In Table 4 , the interaction of Q with FPE is most
signiﬁcant in columns 4 and 6, i.e., when FPE is measured 
using NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI, suggesting that discretized 
NZRET is the best measure of FPE. Since our goal is to show 
that RPE matters for investment- q sensitivity even after 
controlling for FPE, we wish to use the best measure of 
FPE to give it the greatest chance of driving out RPE. Thus, 
we include NZRET _ CY _ LO and NZRET _ CY _ HI, the country- 
year analog of NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI, as additional con- 
trols. These are deﬁned by taking the country-year aver- 
ages of ﬁrm-level NZRET and then splitting them into ter- 
ciles. Column 1 shows that cross-sectional investment- q 
sensitivity rises post-ITE, but the coeﬃcient is not signif- 
icant when pooled across all countries. Column 2 decom- 
poses ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV and ﬁnds that the rise
in investment- q sensitivity post-ITE is signiﬁcant at the 1% 
level for emerging countries, but insigniﬁcant for devel- 
oped countries. The difference between the coeﬃcients on 
A. Edmans et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 126 (2017) 74–96 85 
Table 4 
Disentangling RPE from FPE . 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). The empirical speciﬁcation is similar to model (4) of Table 3 , i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, 
plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q and CF . All variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q 
has been multiplied by 100. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Q 3.413 3.354 3.364 3.409 3.375 3.430 
[0.595] ∗∗∗ [0.584] ∗∗∗ [0.569] ∗∗∗ [0.576] ∗∗∗ [0.568] ∗∗∗ [0.561] ∗∗∗
Q × ITE 0.419 0.421 0.419 0.418 
[0.132] ∗∗∗ [0.132] ∗∗∗ [0.132] ∗∗∗ [0.133] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) 0.728 0.711 
[0.138] ∗∗∗ [0.142] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) 0.297 0.298 
[0.124] ∗∗ [0.125] ∗∗
CF 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.138 
[0.027] ∗∗∗ [0.026] ∗∗∗ [0.027] ∗∗∗ [0.027] ∗∗∗ [0.026] ∗∗∗ [0.026] ∗∗∗
CF × ITE −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] 
CF × IT E _ EM (3) 0.023 0.024 
[0.019] [0.019] 
CF × IT E _ DV (4) −0.021 −0.021 
[0.030] [0.030] 
FSRV 0.005 
[0.005] 
Q × FSRV −0.056 
[0.287] 
F SRV _ LO 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
[0.001] [0.001] 
F SRV _ HI 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
[0.001] [0.001] 
Q × F SRV _ LO 0.050 0.051 
[0.023] ∗∗ [0.023] ∗∗
Q × F SRV _ HI 0.009 0.009 
[0.024] [0.024] 
NZRET −0.003 
[0.005] 
Q ×NZRET 0.014 
[0.113] 
NZRET _ LO 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
[0.001] [0.001] 
NZRET _ HI −0.002 −0.002 
[0.002] [0.002] 
Q × NZRET _ LO −0.072 −0.072 
[0.034] ∗∗ [0.034] ∗∗
Q × NZRET _ HI 0.431 0.432 
[0.137] ∗∗∗ [0.136] ∗∗∗
p -Value (1) = (2) 0.001 0.001 
p -Value (3) = (4) 0.187 0.178 
Adjusted R 2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Observations 324,423 324,423 324,423 324,423 324,423 324,423 
Country , Year , and interactions 
with Q and CF 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enforcers. In columns 5 and 6, since we do not have a control group, we I T E _ EM and I T E _ DV is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Column
3 includes country controls and the results are unchanged.
Columns 4–6 concern the country-period analysis.
The ﬁrst stage estimates investment- q sensitivity at the
country-period level, i.e., pre- and post-ITE separately. In
column 4, the second stage regresses investment- q sensi-
tivity for enforcers on the ITE indicator and ﬁnds no signif-
icant change. Column 5 adds EM , an indicator for whether
a country is an emerging country, and its interaction with
ITE . 17 This interaction is positive and signiﬁcant (albeit at17 In columns 2 and 3, IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV estimate the differential im- 
pact of ITE for each of these groups relative to non-enforcers and already- the 10% level as we only have two observations per coun-
try), suggesting that country-period investment- q sensitiv-
ity rose for emerging countries post-ITE. Column 6 clusters
standard errors at the country level and shows that the re-
sults are unchanged. 18 
Table 5.B repeats the analyses in Table 5.A except for
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. The country-period anal-cannot include both IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV, and so we instead include an 
interaction with EM to capture the incremental effect of ITE in emerging 
countries compared to developed ones. 
18 We present results both with and without country-level clustering 
since we have only two observations per country. 
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Table 5.A 
Two-stage analysis: investment- Q sensitivity. 
The ﬁrst stage regresses INV on Q and CF . The second stage regresses the estimated sensitivities of investment to Q ( ̂  βQ c,t ) on ITE indicators and country- 
level controls. Models (1) to (3) present results based on estimating the ﬁrst-stage investment- q sensitivities at the country-year level. Models (4) to 
(6) present results based on estimating these sensitivities per period (i.e., pre- and post-ITE) and only for enforcers. All other variables are as deﬁned 
in Appendix B . Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, 
respectively. The sample period is 1980–2009. 
Dependent variable ̂ βQ c,t ̂ βQ c,p only enforcers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ITE 0.406 0.244 −0.334 −0.334 
[0.339] [0.518] [0.615] [0.616] 
IT E _ EM (1) 0.908 1.072 
[0.325] ∗∗∗ [0.376] ∗∗∗
IT E _ DV (2) 0.236 0.275 
[0.382] [0.375] 
EM −1.594 −1.594 
[0.964] [0.971] 
ITE × EM 1.849 1.849 
[0.981] ∗ [0.988] ∗
p -Value (1) = (2) 0.083 0.063 
Adjusted R 2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.15 0.15 
Observations 536 536 536 41 41 41 
NZRET _ CY _ LO and Yes Yes Yes No No No 
NZRET _ CY _ HI
Country-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Fixed effects Year, country Year, country Year, country No No No 
Country clustering Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Table 5.B 
Two-stage analysis: investment-CF sensitivity. 
The ﬁrst stage regresses INV on Q and CF . The second stage regresses these estimated sensitivities of investment to CF ( ̂  βCF c,t ) on ITE indicators and 
country-level controls. Models (1) to (3) present results based on estimating the ﬁrst-stage investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities at the country-year level. 
Models (4) to (6) present results based on estimating these sensitivities per period (i.e., pre- and post-ITE) and only for enforcers. All other variables are 
as deﬁned in Appendix B . Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed 
level, respectively. The sample period is 1980–2009. 
Dependent variable ̂ βCF c,t ̂ βCF c,p only enforcers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ITE 0.027 −0.146 −0.163 −0.163 
[0.040] [0.034] ∗∗∗ [0.037] ∗∗∗ [0.036] ∗∗∗
IT E _ EM (1) 0.065 0.065 
[0.048] [0.057] 
IT E _ DV (2) 0.014 0.011 
[0.045] [0.042] 
EM 0.026 0.026 
[0.082] [0.082] 
ITE × EM 0.024 0.024 
[0.084] [0.082] 
p -Value (1) = (2) 0.280 0.352 
Adjusted R 2 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.39 
Observations 536 536 536 41 41 41 
NZRET _ CY _ LO and Yes Yes Yes No No No 
NZRET _ CY _ HI
Country-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Fixed effects Year, country Year, country Year, country No No No 
Country clustering Yes Yes Yes No No Yes ysis of columns 4–6 shows that investment-cash ﬂow sen- 
sitivity decreases signiﬁcantly (at the 1% level) following 
ITE, suggesting that managers shift weight from non-price 
to price measures of investment opportunities. There is 
no difference between emerging and developed countries. 
The country-year analysis of columns 1–3, consistent with 
Table 3 , ﬁnds no change in investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity 
following ITE. 4.2. Cross-sectional analyses 
Our model suggests that ITE should have greatest effect 
on investment- q sensitivity in situations where the man- 
ager is particularly likely to learn from prices, or where 
outside information is likely to rise most strongly fol- 
lowing ITE. We have already shown that the effect of 
ITE is stronger in emerging countries, where RPE rises 
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19 An alternative would be to examine institutional ownership. We are 
aware of only one publicly available database (Factset) with institutional 
ownership for international ﬁrms. Unfortunately, Factset data coverage 
only starts in 1998. 
20 The results are unchanged when calculating the number of analysts 
in the year directly before ITE, or averaged across the three years before 
ITE, rather than across the whole pre-enforcement period. Since the pre- 
period is only deﬁned for enforcers, we use the entire sample period for most prominently post-ITE ( Bushman, Piotroski and Smith,
2005 ). This section performs additional cross-sectional
analyses in this spirit. In addition to providing further ev-
idence for the learning hypothesis, these cross-sectional
tests will further help us address the concern that our re-
sults are driven by FPE (over and above the two tests con-
ducted in Table 4 ). In particular, for our results to be driven
by FPE, it would have to be that FPE not only increases
with ITE, but also increases most in the subsamples in
which our results are stronger—i.e., FPE must be correlated
with not only ITE but also all of our splitting variables. 
We control for FPE using NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI and
their interactions with Q , since Table 4 suggests that they
are the best measures of FPE, as well as ﬁrm and country-
year ﬁxed effects. Since Q × ITE but not CF × ITE is only
signiﬁcant in the full sample, our goal here is to study
how the change in Q × ITE varies across subsamples. Be-
cause we have less power in subsamples, we include CF
only as a control, rather than including all the interactions.
Our speciﬁcation is therefore that of columns 4 and 6 of
Table 4 , without the CF interactions. For brevity, all tables
only report the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and
Q × IT E _ DV . 
4.2.1. Industry concentration and sales volatility 
Proposition 1 predicts that the rise in investment- q sen-
sitivity is increasing in ω, managers’ incentive to learn
from prices. This subsection considers two industry-level
measures of this incentive. First, Allen (1993) argues that
managers are more likely to use stock prices as a source of
information in more concentrated industries. In competi-
tive industries, managers can already learn about their pro-
duction function by observing competitors’ behavior, since
there are several competitors to learn from. In concen-
trated industries, there are fewer rivals to learn from; these
rivals are of different size and likely have different produc-
tion functions. 
Following this argument, we hypothesize that the ef-
fect of ITE on investment- q sensitivity is stronger in con-
centrated industries. We compute industry concentration
in two ways. One is the sales-based Herﬁndahl index for
each industry-country-year. While this is the most stan-
dard measure of industry concentration for US studies, it
does not take into account private ﬁrms, which are partic-
ularly important in emerging countries, nor foreign com-
petitors. Thus, our main measure is the price-cost margin,
which is affected by both private and foreign competitors.
We calculate the margin at the ﬁrm level and then take
the median for each industry-country-year. For both mea-
sures, we split our sample into high and low concentra-
tion groups, comparing industry concentration in a partic-
ular industry-country-year with the median level for the
entire sample and estimate the single-stage regression in-
dividually for each subsample. This split-sample design al-
lows the control variables and ﬁxed effects to vary with
industry concentration. 
Tables 6.A and 6.B present these results. In columns 1
and 2 of Table 6.A , where industry competition is measured
using the price-cost margin, the coeﬃcient on Q × ITE is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level in concentrated industries and
insigniﬁcant in competitive industries, although the coeﬃ-cients are not statistically different. Since the effect of ITE
is highest in emerging countries ( Table 4 ), we hypothesize
that the difference in concentrated versus competitive in-
dustries will be greatest in emerging countries. Columns
3 and 4 investigate this hypothesis by decomposing ITE
into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . We ﬁnd that the increase in
investment- q sensitivity is positive and signiﬁcant at the
1% level in concentrated industries in emerging countries.
This increase is signiﬁcantly higher (at the 1% level) than
in concentrated industries in developed countries, and also
signiﬁcantly higher (at the 5% level) than in competitive in-
dustries in emerging countries. Table 6.B measures industry
competition using the Herﬁndahl index and ﬁnds similar
results. 
Second, Allen (1993) also predicts that learning from
the stock price is likely to be stronger in ﬁrms where the
production function changes frequently so that learning
is particularly valuable. To test this hypothesis, Table 6.C
stratiﬁes industries according to sales volatility. We cal-
culate the time-series standard deviation of the median
log sales within each industry-country pair. We split our
sample into high and low concentration groups, comparing
sales volatility in a particular industry-country with the
median level for the entire sample. Columns 1 and 2 show
that, pooling across all countries, the coeﬃcient on Q × ITE
is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in high-volatility
industries, but insigniﬁcantly positive in low-volatility in-
dustries, and the differences are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the increase in investment-
q sensitivity is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in
volatile industries in emerging countries. The coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcantly higher (at the 5% level) than in high-volatility
industries in developed countries. It is nearly ﬁve times
higher than in low-volatility industries in emerging coun-
tries, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant
since the latter coeﬃcient has a high standard error. Over-
all, the results of Tables 6.A –6.C are consistent with the
prediction of Proposition 1 , that the rise in investment- q
sensitivity is increasing in the manager’s incentive to learn
from prices, and Allen ’s (1993) proxies for this incentive. 
4.2.2. Analyst coverage 
Our next split exploits variation in analyst coverage. We
predict that the effect of ITE on investment- q sensitivity
will be stronger in ﬁrms with low prior analyst coverage. 19
First, these ﬁrms have the greatest scope to enjoy an in-
crease in analyst coverage, and thus RPE, post-ITE. Second,
the impact of one additional analyst is stronger if a ﬁrm
had few analysts to begin with. To test our prediction, we
quantify the number of analysts in Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (“I/B/E/S”) that follow a ﬁrm in the pre-
enforcement period. 20 We split the sample based on the
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Table 6.A 
Cross-sectional analyses: price-cost margin. 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). Price-cost margin is deﬁned using the median of the ﬁrm-level difference between sales and cost-of-goods- 
sold, scaled by the latter, within each industry-country-year. Low and High subsamples are formed based on the median across the entire sample. Average 
value corresponds to the mean value of price-cost margin within each subsample. The speciﬁcation in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , 
i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI alone and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , 
but does not have CF interactions. Models (3) and (4) are the same except for decomposing ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned 
in Appendix B . Only the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV are reported for parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are 
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing 
Q has been multiplied by 100. 
Low margin High margin Low margin High margin 
Average value 0.228 0.374 0.228 0.374 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE 0.044 0.286 
[0.119] [0.174] ∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) 0.289 0.729 
[0.144] ∗∗ [0.141] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) −0.125 0.213 
[0.144] [0.140] 
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.001 0.003 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ITE 0.245 
Q × IT E _ EM 0.028 
Q × IT E _ DV 0.088 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 
Observations 162,369 162,054 162,369 162,054 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6.B 
Cross-sectional analyses: Herﬁndahl index. 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). The Herﬁndahl index is calculated using ﬁrm-level sales within each industry-country-year. Low and High 
subsamples are formed based on the median across the entire sample. Average value corresponds to the mean Herﬁndahl index within each subsample. 
The speciﬁcation in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI alone 
and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , but does not have CF interactions. Models (3) and (4) are the same except for 
decomposing ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Only the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV 
are reported for parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed 
levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q has been multiplied by 100. 
Low conc. High conc. Low conc. High conc. 
Average value 639 3,049 639 3,049 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE 0.365 0.316 
[0.242] [0.172] ∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) 0.040 0.777 
[0.350] [0.193] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) 0.551 0.173 
[0.242] ∗∗ [0.167] 
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.209 0.002 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ITE 0.856 
Q × IT E _ EM 0.077 
Q × IT E _ DV 0.211 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53 
Observations 162,502 161,921 162,502 161,921 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6.C 
Cross-sectional analyses: sales volatility. 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). Sales volatility is deﬁned at the industry level using the standard deviation of (log of) sales within each 
industry-country. Low and High subsamples are formed based on the median across the entire sample. Average value corresponds to the mean value of 
sales volatility within each subsample. The speciﬁcation in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed 
effects, N ZRET _ LO and N ZRET _ HI alone and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , but does not have CF interactions. Models 
(3) and (4) are the same except for decomposing ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Only the coeﬃcients on 
Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV are reported for parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates 
signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q has been multiplied by 100. 
Low vol. High vol. Low vol. High vol. 
Average value 0.308 0.717 0.308 0.717 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE 0.035 0.513 
[0.139] [0.211] ∗∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) 0.194 0.922 
[0.302] [0.251] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) −0.059 0.409 
[0.068] [0.201] ∗∗
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.388 0.018 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ITE 0.047 
Q × IT E _ EM 0.133 
Q × IT E _ DV 0.003 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.45 0.52 0.45 0.52 
Observations 162,428 161,981 162,428 161,981 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 country median, and estimate our single-stage speciﬁca-
tion separately within each subsample. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.D show that coeﬃcient on
Q × ITE is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in low-
coverage ﬁrms but insigniﬁcant in high-coverage ﬁrms;
the coeﬃcients are statistically different at the 5% level.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the increase in investment-
q sensitivity is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in
low-coverage ﬁrms in emerging countries, and signiﬁcantly
higher (at the 5% level) than in low-coverage ﬁrms in de-
veloped countries. The coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcantly nega-
tive in high-coverage ﬁrms in emerging countries, although
again it is not statistically different from low-coverage
ﬁrms in emerging countries since the former coeﬃcient
has a high standard error. 
4.2.3. Financing constraints 
Our ﬁnal split concerns ﬁnancing constraints. The
RPE hypothesis is that price informativeness increases
investment- q sensitivity through a secondary markets
channel: the price contains more information not known
to the manager. An alternative explanation is a primary
markets channel: ITE coincides with a loosening of ﬁnan-
cial constraints, which allows ﬁrms to vary investment
more readily in response to investment opportunities. Un-
der this channel, ITE should increase the sensitivity of in-
vestment to non-price measures of investment opportuni-
ties, not only q , contrary to what we ﬁnd. In this subsec-
tion, we perform an additional test to evaluate this chan-non-enforcers and for already-enforcers. Time trends in analyst coverage 
within these two control groups will be purged by the year ﬁxed effects. 
 
 
 nel. If the effect of ITE operates through loosening ﬁnan-
cial constraints, it should be stronger in ﬁrms that were
more constrained to begin with. In contrast, the RPE chan-
nel predicts that the effect is stronger in unconstrained
ﬁrms, since such ﬁrms can respond more to the increased
information in prices post-ITE. 
We use two measures of ﬁnancial constraints. The ﬁrst
is the main measure of ﬁnancial constraints used in the
international ﬁnance literature: the balance between ex-
ternal and internal ﬁnancing ( Rajan and Zingales, 1998 ). It
is deﬁned at the industry-level as the difference between
capital expenditures and cash ﬂows scaled by capital ex-
penditures, where higher (lower) values indicate industries
with greater external (internal) ﬁnancing and thus lower
(higher) ﬁnancial constraints. The second is ﬁrm size, as
used by Bakke and Whited (2010) , where low size indicates
higher ﬁnancial constraints. 
Consistent with the RPE hypothesis, and inconsistent
with the ﬁnancing channel, columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.E
show that the coeﬃcient on Q × ITE is positive and signif-
icant at the 5% level for ﬁrms with high external ﬁnanc-
ing (i.e., low ﬁnancial constraints), but insigniﬁcantly pos-
itive in constrained ﬁrms. Columns 3 and 4 show that the
coeﬃcient on Q × ITE is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level for ﬁrms with high external ﬁnancing in emerging
countries, but only at the 10% level for high-ﬁnancing ﬁrms
in developed countries and insigniﬁcantly positive for low-
ﬁnancing ﬁrms in both types of countries. While the co-
eﬃcient for ﬁrms with high external ﬁnancing in emerg-
ing markets is over 48% higher than in any other category,
the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant, again due to
high standard errors in the sub-group estimation. Table 6.F
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Table 6.D 
Cross-sectional analyses: analyst coverage. 
This table uses the single-stage speciﬁcation. The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). Analyst coverage is obtained from I/B/E/S and deﬁned based on 
the pre-enforcement period for enforcers and the entire sample period for non-enforcers and already-enforcers. Low and High groups are formed based on 
the median pre-enforcement analyst coverage in each country. Firms with no analyst coverage are included in the Low group. Average value corresponds 
to the mean value of analyst coverage within each subsample. The speciﬁcation in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., includes ﬁrm 
and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI alone and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , but does not have 
CF interactions. Models (3) and (4) are the same except for decomposing ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . 
Only the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV are reported for parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. 
∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q has been 
multiplied by 100. 
High coverage Low coverage High coverage Low coverage 
Average value 4.588 0.174 4.588 0.174 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE −0.103 0.336 
[0.147] [0.142] ∗∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) −0.035 0.535 
[0.462] [0.150] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) −0.131 0.270 
[0.081] [0.149] ∗
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.839 0.043 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ITE 0.037 
Q × IT E _ EM 0.314 
Q × IT E _ DV 0.024 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.49 
Observations 36,972 287,451 36,972 287,451 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6.E 
Cross-sectional analyses: ﬁnancial constraints (external ﬁnancing). 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). External versus internal ﬁnancing follows the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and is deﬁned 
at the industry-level as the difference between capital expenditures and cash ﬂows scaled by capital expenditures, where higher (lower) values indicate 
industries with greater external (internal) ﬁnancing. Low and High groups are based on the median pre-enforcement values for each country. Average value 
corresponds to the mean value of external ﬁnancing within each subsample. The speciﬁcation in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., 
includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI alone and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , but 
does not have CF interactions. Models (3) and (4) are the same except for decomposing ITE into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned in 
Appendix B . Only the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV are reported for parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q 
has been multiplied by 100. 
Low ﬁnancing High ﬁnancing Low ﬁnancing High ﬁnancing 
Average value −0.158 1.128 −0.158 1.128 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE 0.153 0.418 
[0.134] [0.168] ∗∗
Q × IT E _ EM (1) 0.400 0.591 
[0.276] [0.220] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) 0.064 0.342 
[0.114] [0.190] ∗
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.212 0.346 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ENF × POST 0.192 
Q × E NF _ E M × POST 0.658 
Q × ENF _ DV × POST 0.157 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.49 
Observations 171,052 153,355 171,052 153,355 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6.F 
Cross-sectional analyses: ﬁnancial constraints (ﬁrm size). 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). Small and Large ﬁrms are deﬁned based on the median market capitalization in each country. The speciﬁca- 
tion in models (1) and (2) is similar to model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO and NZRET _ HI alone and interacted 
with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q , but does not have CF interactions. Models (3) and (4) are the same except for decomposing ITE 
into IT E _ EM and IT E _ DV . All other variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Only the coeﬃcients on Q × ITE , Q × IT E _ EM, and Q × IT E _ DV are reported for 
parsimony. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample 
period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q has been multiplied by 100. 
Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms 
Average value $36m $1,178m $36m $1,178m 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q × ITE 0.169 0.196 
[0.375] [0.145] 
Q × IT E _ EM (1) −0.076 0.451 
[0.602] [0.137] ∗∗∗
Q × IT E _ DV (2) 0.369 0.103 
[0.376] [0.163] 
p -Value of (1) = (2) 0.522 0.041 
p -Value of diff. in: 
Q × ENF × POST 0.946 
Q × E NF _ E M × POST 0.413 
Q × ENF _ DV × POST 0.542 
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q × NZRET _ LO, and 
Q × NZRET _ HI
Adjusted R 2 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.58 
Observations 161,119 163,304 161,119 163,304 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 shows similar results using ﬁrm size, although now the co-
eﬃcient on large ﬁrms in signiﬁcantly higher (at the 1%
level) in emerging countries than in developed ones. 
Note that, while an increase in investment- q sensitivity
is consistent with investment responding more readily to
growth opportunities, and thus more eﬃcient decisions, it
is not a direct measure of real eﬃciency. 21 It may be that
investment- q sensitivity arises because managers tend to
overinvest due to empire-building concerns, but are lim-
ited by ﬁnancial constraints; high q allows them to issue
equity and overinvest more. Thus, high investment- q sen-
sitivity may be a sign of ineﬃciency. Under this explana-
tion, it is unclear why investment- q sensitivity should rise
post-ITE. If ITE were correlated with improvements in gov-
ernance, investment- q sensitivity should fall; if ITE were
somehow correlated with declines in governance, the in-
crease in investment- q sensitivity should be stronger in
ﬁrms that were previously ﬁnancially constrained, which
is contradicted by the results in Tables 6.E and 6.F . 
5. Robustness tests 
This section presents the results of robustness tests. We
continue to use the speciﬁcation in column 4 of Table 4 ,
which includes Q × NZRET _ LO and Q × NZRET _ HI. 21 As discussed at the end of Section 2.2 , we do not study real eﬃciency 
directly since it may change due to the other effects of ITE studied by 
prior literature (e.g., a reduction in the cost of capital), rather than ITE 
allowing the manager to learn more from prices. 
 
 
 
 
 5.1. Effect of insider trading announcement 
As stated previously, our main concern is that the as-
sociation between ITE and increases in investment- q sensi-
tivity arises because ITE is endogenous and coincides with
general improvements to the ﬁnancial sector or other laws
that improve corporate governance. If so, we might expect
the announcement of insider trading laws to be also corre-
lated with such improvements, and also raise investment-
q sensitivity. However, under the RPE hypothesis, the mere
announcement, rather than enforcement, of insider trading
laws should have no effect on RPE and thus investment- q
sensitivity. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ﬁnd only en-
forcement, not announcement, reduces the cost of capi-
tal (which they argue arises from the deterrence of in-
sider trading), and Bushman et al. (2005) ﬁnd that only
enforcement increases outside information acquisition as
measured by analyst coverage. 
We thus perform a falsiﬁcation test using insider trad-
ing announcement rather than enforcement as the event.
We replace ITE with ITA , an indicator that equals one on
or after insider trading announcement for countries that
announced insider trading laws within our sample period,
and is zero otherwise. Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the
coeﬃcient on Q × ITA is insigniﬁcant. 
5.2. Time trends around ITE 
A second way to address the endogeneity of ITE is
to study whether it captures ongoing time trends in
investment- q sensitivity that may have started prior to
the enforcement date. We thus study pre-ITE differences
in investment- q sensitivity. Similar to Bertrand and Mul-
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Table 7 
Alternative empirical speciﬁcations. 
The dependent variable is investment ( INV ). The speciﬁcation is that of model (4) of Table 4 , i.e., includes ﬁrm and country-year ﬁxed effects, NZRET _ LO 
and NZRET _ HI alone and interacted with Q , plus Country and Year alone and interacted with Q and CF . Only the coeﬃcients on the relevant variables 
are reported for parsimony; all other variables are as deﬁned in Appendix B . Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ( ∗∗) ( ∗) 
indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed levels. The sample period is 1980–2009. The coeﬃcient on any term containing Q has been multiplied by 
100. Speciﬁcations: (1): Insider trading announcement; (2): Verifying parallel trends; (3): Dynamic treatment effect; (4): Firm controls; (5): ( −5, +5) event 
window. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q × ITE ×BEFORE 2 0.053 
[0.072] 
Q × ITE ×BEFORE 1 0.086 
[0.106] 
Q × ITE 0.464 0.473 0.220 
[0.156] ∗∗∗ [0.201] ∗∗ [0.072] ∗∗∗
Q × ITA 0.188 
[0.123] 
Q × ITE ×AFTER 0 0.372 
[0.192] ∗
Q × ITE ×AFTER 1 0.236 
[0.123] ∗
Q × IT E × AF T ER 2+ 0.469 
[0.145] ∗∗∗
CF × ITE ×BEFORE 2 −0.024 
[0.033] 
CF × ITE ×BEFORE 1 −0.014 
[0.039] 
CF × ITE −0.015 −0.042 0.005 
[0.032] [0.022] ∗ [0.029] 
CF × ITA −0.011 
[0.039] 
CF × ITE ×AFTER 0 −0.028 
[0.034] 
CF × ITE ×AFTER 1 0.016 
[0.032] 
CF × IT E × AF T ER 2+ −0.004 
[0.023] 
ME −0.003 
[0.001] ∗∗∗
LEV −0.049 
[0.005] ∗∗∗
CASH 0.0 0 0 
[0.0 0 0] 
RETAINED −0.001 
[0.0 0 0] ∗∗∗
SGR 0.003 
[0.001] ∗∗∗
AGE -0.002 
[0.0 0 0] ∗∗∗
N ZRET _ LO, N ZRET _ HI, Q × N ZRET _ LO, and Q × NZRET _ HI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.54 
Observations 324,423 324,423 324,423 243,122 107,120 
Country , Year , and interactions with Q nd CF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, country-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 lainathan (2003) , we create a new indicator BEFORE 1, 
which equals one in the year before ITE and zero in all 
other years. For example, for Belgium, which enforced in- 
sider trading laws in 1994, this variable is one only in 
1993. We also create BEFORE 2, which equals one two years 
before ITE (in 1992, in the above example). 
Column 2 of Table 7 adds the new interactions 
Q × ITE ×BEFORE 1 and Q × ITE ×BEFORE 2. The new inter- 
actions are individually insigniﬁcant, suggesting that en- 
forcers did not have different investment- q sensitivities to 
other countries in each of the two years priors to ITE. They 
are also insigniﬁcantly different from each other, suggest- ing that their investment- q sensitivities were not trending 
prior to ITE differentially from other countries. The coeﬃ- 
cient on Q × ITE is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. 
In column 3, we study how long it takes for ITE to af- 
fect investment- q sensitivity. We deﬁne the new indica- 
tor AFTER 0, which equals one in the year of ITE (1994, in 
the Belgium example) and zero in other years. (This vari- 
able contrasts ITE , which equals one in the year of ITE and 
all future years.) We also create AFTER 1, which equals one 
in the year after ITE (1995, in the above example), and 
AF T ER 2+ , which equals one two years after ITE and in all
future years (from 1996 onwards). Column 3 interacts ITE 
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 with these three indicators. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
on AFTER 0 and AFTER 1 are signiﬁcantly positive at the 10%
level, and that on AF T ER 2+ is signiﬁcantly positive at the
1% level. Thus, it takes two years for the effect of ITE on
investment- q sensitivity to have its full impact, which is
consistent with it taking time for outsiders (e.g., analysts)
to start gathering information about a ﬁrm. 
5.3. Alternative speciﬁcations 
This section presents the results of additional robust-
ness tests. In column 4, we verify robustness to adding
ﬁrm-level controls. While Roberts and Whited (2012) rec-
ommend against adding controls that may be affected by
the treatment in a difference-in-differences, they also note
that “if assignment is random, then including additional
covariates should have a negligible effect on the estimated
treatment effect.” We thus add F IRM _ CT RL, a vector of ad-
ditional ﬁrm-level determinants of investment. These in-
clude log market equity ( ME ), which is the only additional
control used in Foucault and Frésard (2012) , plus ﬁve vari-
ables from Asker et al. (2015) : SGR (one-year sales growth),
AGE (ﬁrm age), book leverage ( LEV ) deﬁned as long-term
debt divided by total assets, cash and short-term invest-
ments divided by total assets ( CASH ), and retained earnings
scaled by total assets ( RETAINED ). The coeﬃcient on Q × ITE
is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, despite the sam-
ple size falling by 25%. 
Column 5 uses a narrower event window around ITE,
to focus on the years most affected by ITE and address
concerns that our results are driven by general trends un-
related to the ITE event. We consider a ten-year window
that begins ﬁve years before and ends ﬁve years after ITE,
and delete all observations where the country is an en-
forcer and the current year is outside this window. All
observations for already-enforcers and non-enforcers prior
to 2003 are retained, since 1998 is the ﬁnal ITE date in
our sample and so there are no data for enforcers after
2003. The coeﬃcient on Q × ITE is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. In unreported results, the ﬁndings are the
same when using a six-year window that begins three
years before and ends three years after ITE. In column 4,
the change in investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 10% level; in other columns it is
insigniﬁcant. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the real effects
of ﬁnancial markets—the effect of stock prices on real
decisions—depend not on the total amount of information
in prices (forecasting price eﬃciency) but the amount of
information in prices not already known to the decision
maker (revelatory price eﬃciency). We build a theoreti-
cal model which shows that ITE increases information ac-
quisition by outsiders, and thus revelatory price eﬃciency
and investment- q sensitivity, particularly if outsider infor-
mation is important for investment decisions. Consistent
with the model’s predictions, we ﬁnd that such enforce-
ment signiﬁcantly increases the sensitivity of investmentto q , even when controlling for total price informative-
ness, but does not change its sensitivity to cash ﬂow, a
non-price measure of investment opportunities. We also
control for between-country and across-year differences
in investment- q sensitivity, thus extending the generalized
difference-in-differences framework to a setting in which
the outcome of interest is a slope coeﬃcient rather than
a level variable. These results are particularly strong for
emerging countries, in which information acquisition by
outsiders rises most strongly post-ITE, but total price in-
formativeness is unchanged. They are also stronger in sit-
uations in which managerial learning from the stock price
is likely more important (concentrated and volatile indus-
tries), as well as ﬁrms with lower pre-enforcement ana-
lyst coverage (and thus higher potential for outsider in-
formation to rise post-ITE) and ﬁnancial constraints (that
would restrict their ability to respond to more informative
prices). 
Overall, these results suggest that it is not only the total
amount of information in prices that matters for real ef-
ﬁciency, but the source of information in prices—whether
this information is already known to the decision maker.
As a result, measures of total price informativeness may
be insuﬃcient for measuring the contribution of ﬁnancial
markets to the eﬃciency of real decisions. The results sug-
gest a new cost of insider trading that is absent from prior
literature. Previous research studies the effect of insider
trading on total price informativeness (e.g., Manove, 1989;
Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Leland, 1992 ),
under the assumption that outsider and insider informa-
tion are substitutes. However, this paper suggests that it
is outsider information that matters for investment deci-
sions. Thus, even if the decrease in outsider information in
prices, that results from allowing insider trading, is offset
by the increase in insider information, real eﬃciency may
still decline. 
More broadly, our results build on a recent literature
that documents correlations between price informativeness
and real decisions, shows that this correlation is stronger
when learning is more likely, and/or directly tests non-
learning explanations. We contribute to this literature by
studying a shock to price informativeness, helping us move
towards causal evidence that managers learn from prices,
and that ﬁnancial markets have real effects. 
Appendix A. Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1 . Both types of traders maximize the con-
ditional expectation of θ − p times their respective asset
holding ( x i and y ), taking into account their impact on p . It
follows that x i = 1 λE[ θ − p| s i ] and y = 1 λE[ θ − p| s M ] . Plug-
ging in the functional form of p and using Bayes’ rule to
compute the conditional expectations of θ ( E[ θ | s M ] = θ1
and E[ θ | s i ] = h η
h η+ h θ2 
s i ) leads to the expressions for x i and
y . 
Turning to the comparative statics, outsiders’ trading
aggressiveness d x increases in h η , because a more precise
noise term increases the quality of their signal. It decreases
in h θ , because more volatile θ increases their information
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h θ
 θ + ()
+ 2 c
 λ2 h θ
(  
 advantage, the number of speculators a due to competi- 
tion, and price impact λ. The insider’s trading aggressive- 
ness d y is decreasing in h θ , a , and λ for the same reasons. 
In contrast to d x , d y is decreasing in h η: when outsiders are 
better informed, the insider trades less aggressively. 
Proof of Lemma 2 . This is a special case of Lemma 1 with 
insider trading with the additional restriction y ′ = 0 . 
Proof of Lemma 3 . 
1. The expression for ﬁrm investment follows from differ- 
entiating the objective function (1) to yield 
K = 1 
c 
E [ (1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 | s M , p ] . (13) 
From the equilibrium security price p = 
λ
(∑ a 
i =1 x i + y + z 
)
we plug in y = d y s M (with s M = θ1 ) 
and x i = d x s i (with s i = θ1 + θ2 + ηi ) to yield: 
p = λ
( 
ad x (θ1 + θ2 ) + d y θ1 + z + d x 
a ∑ 
i =1 
ηi 
) 
. (14) 
Rearranging yields 
1 
λ
p−d y θ1 
ad x 
− θ1 = θ2 + 1 a 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z ad x . 
Since 1 a 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z ad x is mean-zero, s p ≡
1 
λ
p−d y θ1 
ad x 
− θ1 is 
an unbiased signal of θ2 . The precision of this signal 
can then be computed as h p ≡ Var 
(
1 
a 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z ad x 
)−1 = 
d 2 x a 
2 h ηh z 
h η+ d 2 x ah z 
. 
From Bayes’ rule, the conditional expectation of θ2 is 
equal to the precision-weighted sum of prior and poste- 
rior (price) information, i.e., E[ θ2 | s M , p] = h p h θ+ h p s p . Thus, 
optimal investment is given by: 
K = (1 − ω) θ1 + ωE[ θ2 | s M , p] 
c 
= 
(1 − ω) θ1 + ω h p h θ+ h p s p 
c 
. (15) 
2. Since θ and p are jointly normally distributed, 
V ar(θ | p) = V ar(θ )(1 − ρ2 
θ,p 
) , where V ar(θ ) = 2 h −1 
θ
de- 
notes the variance of θ1 + θ2 . Using the expression 
for the security price in Lemma 1 , the correlation be- 
tween θ and p ( ρθ , p ) can be easily computed as ρθ,p = 
Cov (θ,p) √ 
V ar(θ ) V ar(p) 
. 
3. First note that θ1 is part of the manager’s information 
set and that s M = θ1 is uncorrelated with θ2 . We thus 
have RP E = V ar −1 (θ1 + θ2 | s M , p) = V ar −1 (θ2 | s M , p) =
V ar −1 (θ2 | p) = h p . 
4. Unconditional expected ﬁrm value is given by assets in 
place plus the investment payoff minus the cost of in- 
vestment: 
β = 
c(3 a + 1) h ηh z 
(
4 h θ + (3 a + 4) h η
)
+ c
λ2 h θ
(
4 h θ + (3 a + 4) h η
)
2 + h z 
(
h θ + (3 a + 1) h η
)(
5 h
+ 
ch ηh z (−3 a + 2 ω − 2) 
(
4 h θ + (3 a + 4) h η
h z 
(
4 h 2 
θ
+ 2 
(
9 a 2 + 6 a + 2 
)
h 2 η + (21 a + 8) h ηh θ
)
+V = E 0 
[ 
θ + ( (1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 ) K − 1 
2 
cK 2 
] 
. (16) 
Plugging in equilibrium investment (13) and using the 
law of iterated expectations yields 
V = 1 
2 c 
E 0 
[
E[(1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 | s M , p] 2 
]
= 1 
2 c 
Var 0 ( E[(1 − ω) θ1 + ωθ2 | s M , p] ) 
= 1 
2 c 
(
1 − 2 ω + 2 ω 2 
h θ
− ω 
2 
h p 
)
, (17) 
where the second equality arises because θ1 and θ2 
have zero means, and the third from the law of total 
variance. 
5. First plug investment (2) and the equilibrium security 
price p = λ( ∑ a i =1 x i + y + z) into investment-price sen- 
sitivity βKp = Cov (K,p) Var(p) . Using the deﬁnitions s p = θ2 + 
1 
a 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z ad x , x i = d x (θ1 + θ2 + ηi ) , and y = d y θ1 im-
mediately yields (6) . 
Proof of Lemma 4 . For outsiders, the ex ante expected proﬁt 
from becoming informed is given by π(a ) = E 0 [ x i (θ − p)] ;
they will become informed until the expected proﬁt equals 
F . Computing E 0 [ x i (θ − p)] with and without insider trad- 
ing gives: 
π(a ) = 
9 h η
(
2 h η + h θ
)
λh θ
(
4 h θ + (3 a + 4) h η
)
2 
(18) 
and 
π ′ (a ′ ) = 
h η
(
2 h η + h θ
)
λh θ
(
h θ + (a ′ + 1) h η
)
2 
. (19) 
In equilibrium, π(a ) = F and π ′ (a ′ ) = F . Then, setting
π(a ) = π ′ (a ′ ) and yields a ′ = a + 1 3 (1 + 
h θ
h η
) . From the def-
inition of RPE and the fact that d ′ x = d x , it follows that
h ′ p > h p . 
Plugging in the equilibrium values of { d x , d y , a 
′ } shows
that the change in FPE has the same sign as 2 h η − h θ ,
which can be positive or negative. 
Proof of Proposition 1 . Real eﬃciency is monotonic in h p , 
which increases post-ITE as proven in Lemma 4 . Turning to 
investment-price sensitivity, ﬁrst deﬁne β ≡ β ′ 
K ′ p ′ − βKp . 
From the deﬁnition of βKp and the expressions for K and 
p , it follows that: 
6 a + 2) h η
)
(ω − 1) h θ
4 h θ + (3 a + 4) h η
)2 . (20)
Then, simple differentiation yields ∂(β) 
∂ω 
> 0 . Moreover, it 
follows that β(ω = 1) > 0 and β(ω = 0) < 0 . There-
fore, there exists a ω ∈ (0 , 1) , such that β ≥0 for ω ≥
ω . 
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2 become: Appendix B. Deﬁnition of variables 
Where applicable, Worldscope variable codes are given in p
Variable Deﬁnition 
AF T ER 0 Indicator variable that equals one in the year of i
only. 
AF T ER 1 Indicator variable that equals one in the ﬁrst year
enforcers only. 
AF T ER 2+ Indicator variable that equals one in the second a
enforcement, deﬁned for enforcers only. 
AGE Firm age in years, deﬁned as one plus current yea
Worldscope (“Base-Date”). 
BE F ORE 2 Indicator variable that equals one for the second 
for enforcers only. 
BE F ORE 1 Indicator variable that equals one for the ﬁrst yea
enforcers only. 
CASH Cash and short-term investments (WC02001) scal
CF Cash ﬂows, deﬁned as operating earnings plus de
assets. 
F SRV Firm-speciﬁc return variation, deﬁned as the natu
ﬁrm-level monthly equity excess returns on val
market excess returns. This measure is deﬁned 
F SRV _ LO Indicator variable that equals one if F SRV is in th
deﬁned at the ﬁrm-year level. 
F SRV _ HI Indicator variable that equals one if F SRV is in th
deﬁned at the ﬁrm-year level. 
GDP Natural log of GDP per capita in current $. 
GDPGROW One-year growth in GDP per capita expressed in 
INF L One-year rate of inﬂation expressed in percentage
INV Capital expenditures (WC04601) scaled by lagged
IT E Indicator variable that equals one for the post-en
only. 
IT E _ DV Indicator variable that equals one for the post-en
country enforcers only. 
IT E _ EM Indicator variable that equals one for the post-en
country enforcers only. 
LEV Book leverage, deﬁned as long-term debt (WC032
ME Natural log of market value of equity (in $ million
times closing share price (WC05001). The excha
obtained from WDI. 
NZRET Fraction of trading days in a year with non-zero r
level. 
NZRET _ CY _ LO Indicator variable that equals one if the average ﬁ
the bottom tercile across all country-years. This
NZRET _ CY _ HI Indicator variable that equals one if the average ﬁ
the top tercile across all country-years. This me
NZRET _ LO Indicator variable that equals one if NZRET is in t
is deﬁned at the ﬁrm-year level. 
NZRET _ HI Indicator variable that equals one if NZRET is in t
deﬁned at the ﬁrm-year level. 
Q Tobin’s q deﬁned as the ratio of market value of a
value of assets. 
RE T AINE D Retained earnings, deﬁned as the ratio of retained
SGR Sales growth, deﬁned as the one-year growth in t
T RADE Natural log of global trade, deﬁned as the sum of
annual GDP. 
Appendix C. Alternative model: FPE (not RPE ) matters 
In this section, we consider a variant of the model in
which the insider is separate from the manager (e.g., is a
director or blockholder). In particular, the insider still re-
ceives a perfect signal s M = θ1 about the payoff, but the
manager is completely uninformed. Since the manager al-
ready has an incentive to learn θ1 from the security price,
 we do not need to include the second dimension of uncer-eses. 
Source 
ading enforcement, deﬁned for enforcers N/A 
sider trading enforcement, deﬁned for N/A 
equent years after insider trading N/A 
 the ﬁrst year that the ﬁrm appears on Worldscope 
ore insider trading enforcement, deﬁned N/A 
 insider trading enforcement, deﬁned for N/A 
tal assets. Worldscope 
n and amortization, scaled by total Worldscope 
f one minus the R 2 of a regression of 
hted local market excess returns and US 
rm-year level. 
Datastream 
 tercile for that country. This measure is Datastream 
cile for that country. This measure is Datastream 
WDI 
ge terms. WDI 
WDI 
sets (WC02999). Worldscope 
nt period and is deﬁned for enforcers N/A 
nt period and is deﬁned for developed N/A 
nt period and is deﬁned for emerging N/A 
ed by total assets. Worldscope 
ed as shares outstanding (WC05301) 
 for converting local currency to $ is 
Worldscope and WDI 
This measure is deﬁned at the ﬁrm-year Datastream 
l NZRET for a given country-year is in 
e is deﬁned at the country-year level. 
Datastream 
l NZRET for a given country-year is in 
 deﬁned at the country-year level. 
Datastream 
m tercile for that country. This measure Datastream 
ercile for that country. This measure is Datastream 
arket equity plus book debt) to book Worldscope 
gs (WC03495) to total assets (WC02999). Worldscope 
enues (WC01001). Worldscope 
ndise exports and imports scaled by WDI 
tainty θ2 in order to generate an incentive to learn, and so
we set θ2 = 0 for simplicity. Thus, speculator i receives the
noisy signal s i = θ1 + ηi . 
As before, the ﬁrm manager chooses K to maximize ex-
pected ﬁrm value and traders choose their asset holdings
to maximize expected return. As a result, Lemmas 1 anda
ns
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Lemma 5 . There is a unique security market equilibrium with 
insider trading in which: 
1. Outsiders’ demand is given by x i = d x s i , where d x = 
h η
4 λh θ+ λ(a +2) h η . 
2. Insider demand is given by y = d y s M , where d y = 
h η+2 h θ
4 λh θ+ λ(a +2) h η . 
3. The security price satisﬁes p = λ( ∑ a i =1 x i + y + z) . 
4. Firm investment is given by K = 1 c ((1 − ω) F PE h θ+ F PE s p ) , 
where s p ≡
1 
λ
p 
d y + ad x = θ1 + 
d x 
∑ a 
i =1 ηi + z 
d y + ad x is an unbiased sig- 
nal of θ1 with precision F P E ≡ (d y + ad x ) 
2 
ad 2 x h 
−1 
η + h −1 z 
. 
Lemma 6 . There is a unique security market equilibrium 
without insider trading in which: 
1. Outsiders’ demand is given by x ′ 
i 
= d ′ x s i , where d ′ x = 
h η
2 λh θ+ λ(a ′ +1) h η
. 
2. Insider demand is given by y ′ = d y s M , where d ′ y = 0 . 
3. The security price satisﬁes p ′ = λ( ∑ a i =1 x ′ i + z) . 
4. Firm investment is given by K ′ = 1 c ((1 − ω) F PE 
′ 
h θ+ F PE ′ 
s ′ p ) , 
where s ′ p ≡
1 
λ
p ′ 
a ′ d ′ x 
= θ1 + d 
′ 
x 
∑ a ′ 
i =1 ηi + z 
a ′ d ′ x 
is an unbiased signal 
of θ1 with precision F P E 
′ ≡ (a ′ d ′ x ) 2 
a ′ (d ′ x ) 2 h −1 η + h −1 z 
. 
As before, the number of speculators post-ITE can be 
computed by equating E 0 [ x i (θ − p)] and E 0 [ x ′ i (θ − p ′ )] , i.e., 
the expected trading proﬁts pre- and post-ITE. This leads 
to a ′ − a = 1 + 2 h θ
h η
. 
Investment-price sensitivity is given by: 
βKp = 1 − ω 
λc 
F P E 
(F P E + h θ ) Cov (θ1 , p) 
, (21) 
where F P E = V ar −1 (θ1 | p) and Cov (θ1 , p) = d y + ad x . 
Plugging in the expression for p (and p ′ ), it follows 
that Cov (θ1 , p) = 2 h θ+(a +1) h ηλ(4 h θ+(a +2) h η) = C ov (θ1 , p 
′ ) , i.e., the co- 
variance between the security payoff and price does not 
change after ITE. Therefore, investment-price sensitivity is 
a function of only FPE and constants. 
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